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Research  Repor t s  are p u b l i c a t i o n s  r e p o r t i n g  
on t h e  work o f  t h e  a u t h o r s .  Any views o r  
c o n c l u s i o n s  are t h o s e  o f  t h e  a u t h o r s ,  and do 
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  t h o s e  o f  IIASA. 

A shared interest of the Energy and Urban & ~egional 
Systems groups at IIASA, from its very inception, has been 
the thorny issue of siting large energy production facil- 
ities. In general the problems of embedding very large 
capital investments into regions which bear most of the 
external costs but capture few of the benefits are major 
ones for planning, and nowhere more so than in the complex 
and frequently emotional business of siting nuclear power 
and fuel reprocessing plants. 
The present review of the analytic methods available 
as aids in siting decisions focuses on a single crucial 
stage in the process: after the decision that a specific 
kind of facility is needed somewhere, hut before the detailed 
problems of implementation and administration have to be 
considered. Even in this restricted domain, the authors 
point out that substantial intractabilities remain in the 
choice of objectives, the determination of legitimacy, the 
treatment of uncertainty, and the handling of incommensurable 
values--particularly those involving risk to human life or 
to unique ecological communities, where the standard appara- 
tus for d-iscounting the future becomes nonsensical. Improve- 
ments in method, however, rest on a firm understanding of 
present techniques, which is the reason for this first paper 
in what will likely become a series on siting decisions and 
embedding strategies. 
Harry Swain 
Project Leader 
Urban and Regional Systems 
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Authcrs' Preface 
The question of siting decisions for major facilities 
involves complex interrelationships of spatial and. societal 
distributions of impacts and at the upper end gradates into 
larger decisions of social policy and public welfare. We 
have attempted to isolate one facet of this process, the 
methodological approach to site evaluation, and analyze the 
assumptions implicit in commonly used or recommended method- 
ologies. Were we considering an individual siting decision, 
we would attempt to use a combination of the techniques 
reviewed. here as each has recommending properties that the 
others lack. Nevertheless, a discussion of each methodology 
by itself is helpful as it illuminates characteristics that 
might remain hidden in normal application. We have empha- 
sized two seemingly simple concepts, which nevertheless are 
often transgressed in practice: rigorous properties of 
scaling, and interdepen6encies in d.esi.rahili.ty . 
Our hope in formulating these thoughts stems from a 
desire not so much to advance the state of theoretical 
evaluation methodologies, as to aggregate a body of work in 
a consistent way so that site evaluation might be d-one 
without flagrant d-isregard for interna.1 consistency and the 
principles of measurement. 
As with any joint work, the responsibility and blame 
for the content of our observations are not equally shared. 
The organization and writing of this review was primarily 
the work of G.B. Baecher; J.G. Gros contributed his ideas 
and experience with mathematical aspects of evaluation 
techniques and siting in general, and wrote some of the 
sections, and K.A. McCusker organized much of the literature, 
particularly that on matrix techniques. 
We would particularly like to acknowledge the care 
which Harry Swain has taken in reviewing this paper and 
offering comments. 
G.B. Baecher 
J.G. Gros 
K.A. McCusker 
B a l a n c i n g  Apples  and Oranges :  
Me thodo log ie s  f o r  F a c i l i t y  S i t i n g  D e c i s i o n s  
Gregory  B .  Baecher*  
J a c q u e s  G .  Gros 
IZaren McCusker 
A b s t r a c t  
E v a l u a t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  s i t e s  f o r  m a j o r  con-  
s t r u c t e d  f a c i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e s  comparing i m p a c t s  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  and  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
d e s i r a b l e  y e t  f e a s i b l e  b a l a n c e s .  C u r r e n t l y  employed 
and proposed. m e t h o d o l o g i e s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  d e s i r -  
a b i l i t y  o f  sets o f  i m p a c t s  g e n e r a t e d  by l a r g e  f a c i l -  
i t i e s  a r e  compared,  and  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  
i m p l i c i t  i n  e a c h  a r e  d i s c u s s e d .  I n  a q g r e g a t e ,  t h e  
t h r e e  se ts  o f  method-o logies  cons id -e red  a r e  Cos t -  
B e n e f i t  A n a l y s i s  and i t s  v a r i o u s  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  
m a t r i x  o r  t a b l e a u  methods o f  s e v e r a l  s o r t s ,  and. 
p r e f e r e n c e  t h e o r y  ( o f  which u t i l i t y  i s  a  s p e c i a l  
c a s e ) .  P r i m a r y  a t t e n t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
of o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n e d  o v e r  i m p a c t s .  
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Major  c o n s t r u c t e d .  f a c i l i t i e s  g e n e r a t e  a  s p e c t r u m  o f  
i m p a c t s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e i r  c e n t r a l  f u n c t i o n :  power p l a n t s  
g e n e r a t e  a i r  and  w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  p r o j e c t s  
g e n e r a t e  l a n d - u s e  c h a n g e s ,  and- l a r g e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  p r o j e c t s  
g e n e r a t e  e c o l o g i c a l  d i s r u p t i o n s .  These  i m p a c t s  have  a lways  
been  r e c o g n i z e d ,  if n o t  b e f o r e  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  t h e n  c e r t a i n l y  
a f t e r w a r d - s .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  however ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  f u n c t i o n  o f  
t h e  f a c i l i t y  h a s  a l w a y s  r ece ived .  paramount  a t t e n t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  
* 
The s e n i o r  a u t h o r  would l i k e  t o  acknowledge t h e  s u p p o r t  
o f  t h e  R o c k e f e l l e r  F o u n d a t i o n  t h r o u g h  i t s  C o n f l i c t  i n  I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  P e l a t i o n s  Program FelLowship ,  RF 7 4 0 2 5  a l l o c a t i o n  2 1 ,  
d u r i n g  t h e  t e n u r e  o f  brhich t h e  p r e s e n t  r e p o r t  w r i t t e n .  
out of commitment to general welfare (the Roman aaueducts) 
or to profit (the Suez Canal). Secondary effects were con- 
sidered of sufficiently lesser importance to be ignorable. 
Large-scale water resources development during the 
first half of the twentieth century spawned increased 
attention to techniques of evaluating the spectrum of 
impacts generated by large facilities, but it has been the 
more recent difficulty of siting nuclear power facilities 
which has brought this problem to the awareness of the 
public. Often this awareness has manifested itself in 
emotional and at times semi-rational argument an?. confron- 
tation. It would be unfair to attribute this widespread 
concern to greater vision anfi more complex times. Rather, 
our present attention stems from the growing scarcity of 
resources, in particular suitable sites for large facilities, 
and a growing affluence that allows us to adopt more multi- 
attributed definitions of societal well-being. 
Ultimately, siting decisions are political, both in 
principle and in fact. Within the democratic framework 
they have traditionally been settled by fi-ebate, compromise, 
and majority approval, constrained by notions of minority 
rights and long-term policy. However, the process of 
filtering large numbers of possible sites and making predic- 
tions about impacts is too large and burdensome for complete 
analyses in the political realm. This is where the analyst 
enters the siting decision process, and where the present 
review begins. 
Analytical comparison of prospective sites requires 
balancing adverse and beneficial impacts against the multiple 
and often incompatible objectives of society: it involves 
trading off apples for oranges. The coordinating theme of 
this balancing is the "desirability" we as a society asso- 
ciate with specific impacts against objectives, and this is 
what allows us to compare qualitatively d.ifferent impacts of 
large facilities. Because it is the desirability of impacts 
and not their level that is important, decisions are ulti- 
mately based on subjective preference and not on "objective" 
criteria. One may elect, on suhjective bases, to use a 
seemingly objective selection criterion--for example, 
monetary cost--but this does not make the selection objective; 
it rests upon the criterion, and the criterion upon judgement. 
In approaching site selection, the analyst attempts to 
implement some consistent scheme for assigning d.esirabilities 
to individual impacts and for coalescing these into a d-ecision. 
The result is a set of predicted impacts for each tentative 
site and each important objective, and two or three sites 
emerge which seem most favorable in the sense that the net 
desirability of associated impacts is the greatest. This 
short list of sites and the associated impact predictions 
(not the assigned d-esirabilities but the impacts themselves) 
is the departure point for political decision-making. 
The nature of the results the analyst derives d.epends 
on the models (conceptual or mathematical) he uses to make 
impact predictions and. the "consistent scheme" for evaluating 
and coalescing them. In this paper we compare these schemes 
in terms of the assumptions implicit in their structure and 
their applicability. We emphasize two points in this 
comparison: 
1) Methodologies for comparing the desirabilities of 
impacts differ only in the specification of the 
objective function; this objective function makes 
implicit assumptions a-bout the structure of desir- 
ability over impacts. 
2) For scales of evaluation to he meaningful, one must 
know how numbers behave when combined by simple 
rules; any scaling and combination of impacts and 
their associated desirabilities must be firmly 
grounded in the theory of measurement. 
Although this paper deals entirely with methodologies for 
evaluation, one should keep in mind that analytical evaluation 
is only one phase of the broad process of decision-making. 
By giving it preeminence here, we do not imply its actual 
preeminence in the entire siting process. 
We carefully have drawn boundaries for our discussion so 
that primary attention could be focused upon methodological 
questions rather than political and social ones. One could 
easily argue that what has been eliminated is more important 
than what has been kept; we agree in spirit, but as always 
the normal constraints of time, expertise, and. interest have 
dictated these boundaries. We assume that larger-scale policy 
decisions--for example, whether or not a facility is to be 
constructed at all--have a1read.y been taken; or alternatively, 
that larger-scale benefits and costs that are site-independent 
may be disassociated from siting itself. That is, the question 
whether a nuclear power plant or a highway should be built at 
all, while important and an issue of evaluation itself, is 
not considered here. 
The paper is organized in four parts: siting decisions 
are discussed in general; then an overview of analytical 
evaluation schemes is presented along with their basis in 
measurement theory; three sets of methodologies are summarized 
and compared (cost-benefit analysis, matrix methods, and pref- 
erence theory methods); and finally, application of the meth- 
odologies and general conclusions are discussed. 
11. Sitina and Public ~ecision-Makinu 
1. The Siting Process 
On a conceptual level the question of siting is straight- 
forward: it is merely the comparison of favorable and unfa- 
vorable impacts of a facility according to consistent rules 
for evaluating desirability, and the selection of the site 
that is found to have the highest net desirability. In reality, 
of course, this process is complex, involving both the seeming- 
ly irreconcilable interests of coalitions and vague notions of 
what social policy principles ought to be used as measuring 
rods of desirability. 
The initial criterion in reviewing sites is feasibility. 
For a site to be feasible, the predicted impacts of placing 
a facility there must be within bounds chosen n p r i o r i .  These 
constraints may include: excessive cost, excessive environ- 
mental degradation, undesired land-use alterations, and inequity 
in the distribution of net benefits. This process of elimi- 
nating infeasible sites is sometimes referred to as screening. 
Sites which remain after screening are evaluated in depth 
(Figure 1). 
In the evaluation stage careful predictions are made of 
the type and magnitude of impacts generated by placing the 
facility at each feasible site. Desirabilities of individual 
impacts are evaluated as a function of the importance of the 
social objective they bear on their magnitude, and their prob- 
ability of occurrence. This procedure rests on identifying 
social objectives and specifying desirabilities of impacts 
against those objectives. Impact predictions, while often 
difficult to make with precision (Buehring, 1975) , present 
technical rather than philosophical problems; whereas the 
central questions in evaluation, and those on which the entire 
analysis depends, are what social objectives are used for 
evaluation, and whose concept of desirability is adopted? 
Social Welfare and Selectivity 
Ideally, one would like to make decisions having a social 
impact in light of a general theory of social welfare using 
a comprehensive objective index, which is based on the ethical 
or normative precepts of the society. In reality, of course, 
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attempts to develop a social welfare function have not been 
fruitful, so in practical decision-making a more pragmatic 
and less "objective" criterion must be reverted to. 
Our ability to make comprehensive evaluations is limited 
not only by lack of a general welfare function, but also by 
our inability to predict the myriad of secondary, tertiary, 
and higher-order impacts which a decision generates. The 1960's 
thus saw the development of large simulation models, many of 
them for regional planning, whose purpose was to simulate inter- 
actions and dependencies via a logical chain too complicated 
to be analyzed intuitively. The hope was that this approach to 
analysis would enable us to predict indirect impacts and in- 
clude them in decision-making. But this attempt, too, has not 
been entirely successful (Lee, 1973; Brewer, 1973). 
This brings into clear perspective the problem of iden- 
tifying and selecting important impacts for analysis. We must 
select a limited number of objectives against which we consider 
impacts to be important, and a limited set of indices for 
prediction. In assigning desirabilities to levels of those 
impacts, we must do so subjectively--if not in the way the 
final numbers are placed on impact levels, then in the way 
assumptions are made and data collected. The criteria and 
measurements represent value judgements by the analyst whether 
or not he readily admits it. There is a continuum between the 
analyst and the political decision-maker. In both cases 
decisions are made the same way: the analyst tends to use a 
larger criteria set, and explicitly combines his evaluations 
according to logical rules. But the philosophy of decision 
and the form of evaluation are the same at their philosophical 
foundations. 
What is the overall criterion of evaluation? Given 
benevolence in government or a democratic ethic, the criterion 
of evaluation is the well-being of the population. In positive 
economics and democratic theory this is held to be the pref- 
erences of individuals within society. How these preferences 
are assessed and interpreted is integrally related to the 
technique used for comparing desirabilities of impacts against 
objectives. Assessment methods may be indirect as in using 
market structure and. prices, or direct as in opinion surveys. 
Once again, the analyst's role in this process is to interpret 
those preferences from data and logically combine them so as 
to yield recommendations for the political decision-makers 
(who ultimately interpret desirahilities judgementally). 
3. Sitina vs. Plannina Decisions 
National and regional planning goes on at many levels, 
and it is in the analyst's interest not to confuse the proper 
distribution of authority and decision responsibility within 
that hierarchy. Not every decision made in society must 
involve a reassessment of the basic ethical and economic 
policies of society. In other words, the decision to site a 
nuclear power plant is not the most appropriate point for 
reassessing national energy policy. In actuality, the siting 
decision may be the only (or most accessible) point at which 
a citizen may exert pressure against what is perceived as an 
unresponsive political process; but from the point of view of 
governmental planning this is clearly not the case. On the 
other hand, though, gradations of planning responsibility are 
fuzzy, and the resources for analyzing major siting decisions 
may be much greater than those available for planning overall 
regional development; perhaps this is an inverted situation, 
but it is nevertheless the case. So, another facet of the 
selection question is, how broad does one make the impacts and 
societal objectives considered, and where in the analysis does 
one adopt the results of higher-level decisions as either 
constraints or scales of desirability? In a hierarchy of 
decision which is not rigid, this question assumes consider- 
able importance. 
Ostensibly, we have planning authorities whose business 
it is to evaluate proposals for regional development and to 
arrive at preferred scenarios. To the degree that such bodies 
do have sufficient expertise and financial resources to accom- 
plish their mandate, impacts generated by siting a facility 
should be evaluated for their compatibility with these pre- 
ferred plans. If the preferred plan calls for slow development 
and primarily agricultural patterns of land use, then a facility 
causing inharmonious land uses (e.g., large transportation 
facilities) generates undesired. development impacts. In the 
reverse situation, a facility inducing larger local employment, 
and thus accelerated development, would be deemed more desir- 
able than one that does not. In this ideal world the siting 
analyst's life would be simpler. 
When no local planning authority exists, the ethical 
question arises, is it appropriate that the analyst treat 
questions of regional development policy. If such questions 
have not been dealt with, they de facto become his respon- 
sibility, and he must grapple with them. Conceptually, the 
task is clear, but practically it is difficult; the project's 
long-term indirect impacts on population, migration, settle- 
ment, and regional land use must be considered in the same way 
as are impacts against other objectives. Typically, this can 
only be accomplished by judgemental or conceptual models, or 
by rather large computer models which include complex inter- 
actions of employment, infrastructure development, and changes 
in environmental quality. The latter models suffer the 
disadvantages of all large models as discussed by Lee (1973). 
If longer-term predictions of land-use and development 
impacts can be made, the analyst is still faced with the 
problem of evaluating the desirability of such changes. The 
time is past when simple economic indices of regional develop- 
ment (e.g., increases in tax base, increases in real income 
flow) can be used as positively correlated measures of desir- 
ability. At present even the desirability of regional devel- 
opment is in question. Local residents do not always favor 
increased development; or they may do so, while far distant 
urbanites prefer to maintain unspoiled rural landscapes--even 
if they are unlikely ever to visit the region. 
In short, unless a well-conceived plan for regional devel- 
opment exists, the analyst, by default, must develop a surrogate 
plan. We would hold that this is not really his mandate, but 
a burden which is dealt him. 
4. Coalitions and Esuitv 
There are two distinct concepts with respect to the 
disaggregation of society into groups. The first is that 
individuals place different weights on the desirabilities of 
impacts and on marginal rates of preferential substitution 
among impacts; here, the question naturally arises whose 
definition of desirability ought to be used in siting decisions. 
The second concept is that of the distribution of benefits and 
costs over society. Large facilities have uneven spatial and 
social distributions of impacts, and one may value a level of 
equity in these distributions. We will address legitimacy of 
interest first, and then return to equity. 
Welfare economics has attempted to structure a theory to 
account for differences in individual preference, and has 
succeeded mostly in proving the great difficulty or the impos- 
sibility of doing so. Pragmatically, therefore, in siting 
decisions one normally views differences in preference or 
definition of desirability as being represented by groups of 
opinion. While the term is misused in this context, we often 
call these assumedly homogeneous clusters of preferences 
interest groups, and we assume that the interests of individ- 
uals within groups can be approximated by a single structure of 
desirability for impacts. (In fact, this is not the case; 
interest groups either are not organized groups at all (e-g., 
see Olson, 1965), or are coalitions formed for attaining some 
common goal, but one sought by each individual within the 
coalition for perhaps very different reasons.) Such simpli- 
fications are undertaken to make the problem of analysis 
tractable, just as one makes simplifications in analyses, 
whether they be mathematical or purely judgemental constructs. 
The ultimate burden in combining different concepts of 
desirability rests with political decision-makers, this being 
a fundamental function of the political system. The analyst's 
role is to indicate to the political decision-maker the impli- 
cations of weighting different groups' interests in different 
ways on the "optimal" decision. In the more purely economic 
approaches to siting decisions, such as cost-benefit analysis, 
an assumption is made that differing preferences are naturally 
and properly aggregated in the market-place; yet even here, 
the desirabilities of non-market impacts (or impacts with which 
there is little experience) still require an artificial weight- 
ing and coalescence. If one uses the market-aggregated. will- 
ingness-to-pay of urban and rural residents as a measure of the 
desirability of aesthetically pleasing landscapes, a value 
assumption is still made about the relative weights given 
each group, though the weights are not explicitly stated as 
they would be with other methods. No matter how a siting 
decision is evaluated, the preferences of different groups 
must be weighted. Methods that do not do so explicitly must 
do so implicitly; usually this means weighting all groups 
equally. 
Conceptually, one can think of the question of weighting 
interest group preferences as movement along the so-called 
Pareto frontier. This surface is the locus of all decision 
alternatives (sites) for which no other alternative exists 
that would be equally preferred by all groups and more pre- 
ferred by at least one. In Figure 2 no sites are available 
which, for the several impacts they generate, are more pref- 
erable to both groups A and B than, say, site #l. Here, we 
would hold that it is the analyst's role to determine those 
sites which are on the frontier, and the sensitivity of each 
group's level of desirability to movement along the frontier. 
The decision among sites on the frontier is innately political, 
although this task might be aided. by sensitivity analysis 
which would indicate "optimal" sites for ranges of weights 
I 
applied to each group's interests. 
The dynamics of the political process makes the view just 
presented myopic. At any one time many projects are being 
considered by political bodies, and often equity is achieved 
not within a single project over several projects. A project 
that favors one interest group over another might be offset 
by one which favors in reverse. In the democratic framework 
this is related to keeping constituencies satisfied (or 
placated) and is a natural offshoot of the legislators' self- 
interest in ,remaining in office. Thus, the question of whose 
measures of desirability we use is closely related to the 
concept of equity of impact distribution. 
A fundamental tenet of contemporary political philosophy 
is that fruits and labors of society should be equitably 
shared by members of society. However, equity is one of those 
nebulous policy concepts mentioned in the introduction. No 
one is quite sure, in operational terms, what equity ought 
'The concept of Pareto optimality and the frontier are 
used here for illustration only. There are theoretical 
questions relevant to using Paretian analysis in actual 
decisions, one of which is taken up in Appendix 11. 
PARETO FRONTIER 
GROUP A PREFERENCE 
FIGURE 2 
to mean, but we all know that it's important. In traditional 
project decision-making, equity has been treated either as 
a prior constraint that a proposal must satisfy or as an 
"external" weighted in conjunction with economic efficiency. 
A project that is otherwise efficient in the sense of producing 
a net increase in benefit to society, irrespective of to whom 
it accrues (i.e., potential Pareto improvement), might be 
discarded if it produces what is politically viewed. as a 
severely adverse distribution of those costs and benefits. 
More recently introduced. methodologies, as discussed in 
Sections IV - VII, attempt to measure equity explicitly as 
one impact of the decision and subjectively assign desir- 
abilities to it which can then be combined with other impacts. 
We are, however, far from a workable definition of equity or 
attribute scale that could be included in an analysis; even 
equity of income distribution generated by projects, a seem- 
ingly simple problem, is difficult to grapple with normatively 
(Mishan, 1971). The further complication, in siting studies, 
of the geographic distribution of effects (Figure 3) makes 
the problem exceedingly difficult unless purely judgemental 
approaches using political opinion are introduced. 
Once again, though, to maintain our perspective merely 
at the single project level is naive. Political decision- 
makers almost invariably favor projects generating impact 
distributions as shown schematically by curve A in Figure 4 
over those generating curve B, even though an analytic index 
of equity might rate A and B at about the same quantitative 
level of "inequity. "2 There is a quality difference in the 
inequity caused by A and B because, if need be, a purely 
redistributional project can be formulated, aimed directly at 
the groups adversely affected by project A. In a conflict 
- 
2~his example is due to H. Swain (personal comunication, 
1975). 
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resolution sense, this would be the same as a side payment 
to adversely affected groups to "get them to go along" with 
the project--something which is not at all rare in siting 
major facilities. Techniques used to include equity in 
specific evaluation methodologies are discussed further in 
Sections IV - VI. 
5. Temporal Distribution of Impacts and Irreversibilities 
Benefits and costs accrue from a project non-uniformly 
in time. Capital outlays for facility construction are neces- 
sarily made at the very beginning, while financial returns on 
investment, social disruptions, and environmental impacts 
come at varying times, from almost immediately to the distant 
futiire. Some irreversible impacts, such as major ecological 
changes, continue in perpetuity. Ideally one would like some 
analytical way of treating these streams of benefits and costs. 
Analytically, this evaluation might be simply represented 
by a series of the following type, in which NB+ is the net 
benefit of the project accruing at time t: 
The question is how to evaluate the constants vl, . . .  ,vn; and 
whether or not the aggregation ought to have a more compli- 
cated form than a simple sum (Meyer, 1969; Koopmans, 1960). 
This is a problem that has received extensive attention, yet 
remains unanswered. 
The traditional way of handling intertemporal streams 
of costs and benefits has been to assume an additive form 
as shown in Equation 1 and adopt a discounting factor relating 
the value vt to its predecessor by a constant ratio, r, 
v t-1 - v 
= r = discount rate . 
v + 
Koopmans (1960) gives the necessary conditions for this form 
of discounting, called the "discounted sum," to be theoret- 
ically correct. The discounted. sum has been generally applied 
in cost-benefit analysis, and considerable work has gone into 
techniques of establishing appropriate discount factors (e.g., 
Layard, 1972; Roskill, 1970; Yishan, 1971, UNIDO, 1972). 
Some of these are the market interest rate on capital, the 
marginal rate of productivity of capital in the economy, or 
simply a value judgement of political decision-makers. The 
time-aggregated net benefit (NB total ) of a project may fluc- 
tuate substantially on the basis of changes in the discount 
rate, and varying of this rate has often Seen used to justify 
bureaucratically favored projects that would not be justified 
by more impartial analysis (Berkman and Viscusi, 1973). 
Further, the normal procedures for establishing the discount 
rate are not entirely satisfactory because for societal projects, 
the discount rate reflects social policy on how much one is 
willing to forego now for future benefit. In a trad-itional 
sense, the best procedure, as with equity, is to do a sensi- 
tivity analysis using discount rate as a variable, and then 
see how high or low the rate would need to be to change the 
''best" decision. 
Specifically with respect to siting decisions for large 
facilities, two points are important. First, many of these 
decisions are private ones involving private funding; this 
being the case, the discount rate for financial costs and. 
returns can be chosen by the private agent and will probably 
reflect market costs of capital. Second, the siting decision 
as we have outlined it here is not a decision to construct 
or not to construct a facility, but is limited rather to 
where to construct it. Therefore, as a given type of facility 
constructed in different places generates approximately the 
same temporal distribution of impacts (although not in the 
same intensity), siting decisions are less sensitive to dis- 
counting than the overall project decision might be. 
While discounted sum techniques may he appropriate for 
financial impacts even though the actual rate of discount 
is difficult to specify, the discounted sum is not so appar- 
ently appropriate for non-financial impacts (i.e., social and 
environmental ones), and the whole question of non-renewable 
resources is still in an embryonic state of analysis. An 
approach of the type used by Meyer (1969) may shed light on 
time streams of non-financial impacts as that work expands; 
similar comments can be made on work evaluating alternatives 
that exhaust non-renewable resources or generate irreversible 
impacts that is being undertaken by Krutilla and his associ- 
ates at Resources for the Future (Fisher and Krutilla, 1974; 
Krutilla et al., 1972). At present, these remain unanswered 
questions. 
An associated set of problems is that of option fore- 
closure, resilience, and incrementalism. One type of irre- 
versibility, although not the type usually dealt with, is that 
of foreclosing options that might later have been open. 
Krutilla et al. (1972) discusses this, as does Walters (1975). 
Option foreclosure means that impacts generated by a decision 
will make future decision alternatives impossible. For 
example, siting a nuclear waste storage facility will mean 
that the site is forever unusable for other purposes. The 
degree of desirability of foreclosing future options depends 
on the probability that one would at some later time elect 
to use them, the time when that might occur, and the benefit 
that would have been derived from their use. In some cases, 
positive discounting factors (i.e., which give more weight 
to future benefits) might be appropriate to describe goods 
that will become increasingly scarse with time. Some of these 
might be open space, environmentally undisturbed wilderness, 
or non-renewable resources (Krutilla, 1972). Option fore- 
closure also deals with impacts that cannot be predicted, 
but that will change the environment of future decisions and 
thus change in unpredictable ways the options that would have 
become available (Walters, 1975). Perhaps the best way of 
treating such foreclosure practically is by instituting incre- 
mental decisions the results of which can be sequentially 
evaluated, and by designing alternatives which are resilient 
to unforeseen events. In siting, while incrementalism can 
be practiced only by building small facilities, resilience 
would mean selecting sites that are far enough removed from 
population, naturally undisturbed areas, etc., that unfore- 
seen impacts would have little undesirability. Unfortunately, 
it is because of a lack of such sites that the issue has 
become so important. 
A major issue growing out of resilience and option fore- 
closure is what Hafele has called "hypotheticality," that is, 
the problem of dealing with low-probability events with which 
we have no experience, (e.g., large-scale accidental releases 
of radiation from reactors) (~afele, 1974). This problem 
increases in importance with rapid technological developments 
which exclude an incremental approach to d-ecision-making. 
The question is not beyond the bounds of the siting decision 
since the major objection to urban sites is large-scale health 
and safety risks. 
APPENDIX 
Pareto Admissibility under Uncertainty 
If equity is considered important by the decision-maker, 
an optimal alternative need not lie on the Pareto frontier 
defined by interest-group preference (Keeney, personal comrnu- 
nication). In the case shown in Figure 5 the problem is to 
select site A or site B. These sites are associated with 
uncertain impacts along one attribute which lead to different 
levels of desirability (i.e., utility) for the two groups 
G1 and G2. Clearly, alternative A is a point on the Pareto 
frontier composed of the expected utilities of impacts, 2nd 
has a higher expected utility for both G1 and G2 than alter- 
native B, which must therefore be below the frontier. Yet, 
if the decision-maker considers equity to be an important 
attribute of any set of impacts, then he might favor alter- 
native B to A, because no matter how impacts accrue, equity 
of impact will be maintained. Thus, under uncertainty an 
optimal decision alternative need not be on the Pareto frontier. 
SITE A 
EXPECTED UTILITY 
UTILITY OF OUTCOME: 
GROUP GI : 1.0 
SITE B 
EXPECTED UTILITY 
WlTH RESPECT TO 
G2 
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111. Structure of Evaluation Methodologies 
Analytically, all evaluation methodologies have a similar 
structure. In this section we discuss that structure and in- 
troduce terms and notations to simplify our further comments. 
Siting decisions are, in fact, decisions among variables 
in two sets: a set of possible sites, and a set of possible 
facility technologies. Jointly, these might be called the 
set of feasible alternatives. Symbolically, if the set of 
sites is 2 = [S~,...,S~] and the set of facility technologies 
is Q = [ql,...,qwl, then the set of feasible alternatives 
is composed of all possible pairs (si,q.) that remain after 
3 
screening. As impacts depend on both the site and technology 
selected, "siting" decisions must involve both variahles. 
Feasible alternatives are judged. by their impacts against 
a set of objectives society holds important--e.g., cost, 
environmental degradations, an6 social disruption. Since 
objectives are usually vague and qualitative concepts,. a set 
of indices is chosen for measuring levels of impact against 
objectives. We will call these attributes. For example, to 
quantify the degree of impact a site-technology pair has on 
the objective "minimize water pollution," we might use the 
attribute "concentration of pollutant y in effluent waters." 
Associated with each objective is at least one scalar or 
vector attribute; let the set of attributes be denoted 
x = [x,, ..., xnl. 
Decisions are made on the basis of predicted impacts 
measured on the set of attributes associated with important 
objectives. These predictions are made judgementally by 
experts using mathematical and statistical models, basic 
concepts and relationships from the physical and social sci- 
ences, and the like. In general, these predictive relation- 
ships might be said to map site-technology pairs onto the 
attribute space. Since pred-ictions are uncertain and depen6 
on exogenous random variables, such as weather, accidents, 
and future population densities, they are actually probability 
distributions defined over the set of attributes. Collectively, 
we call these predictive distributions the set of t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  and denote them as the joint probability function 
in which - 8 is the set of exogenous variables (Figure 6 ) .  
Implicit in the set of technological relations are not 
only impact predictions for a given site-technology pair, but 
also the m a r g i n a l  r a t e  o f  t e c h n i c a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  among impacts; 
that is, the rate at which it is technically possible to trade 
one impact for another (in an uncertain domain). For example, 
pollution emissions can be reduced. if one is willing to increase 
project cost; or a natural wilderness area can be preserved if 
one is willing to site a power plant nearer to a densely popu- 
lated area. The concept of marginal rate of techni-cal substi- 
tution is an important one because it is, in some sense, half 
of the evaluation. The other half is the m a r g i n a l  r a t e  o f  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n ,  the rate at which one impact can be 
traded for another without changing the aggregate level of 
desirability of the set of impacts. At the optimal decision 
(under certainty) these two marginal rates are equal (Figure 
7)  . 
The marginal rate of preferential substitution is implicit 
in whatever objective function is used to evaluate d-ifferent 
sets of impacts. Objective functions are numerical represen- 
tations of preferences for different attribute levels; the 
optimal decision is the one which has the largest objective 
function value. It is the nature of this objective function 
and of the assumptions implicit in its derivation which 
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distinguishes evaluation methodologies from one another, and 
which is the focus of the present review. 
1. Objectives 
It is assumed here that objectives for siting decisions 
are known or can be generated. Some of these objectives are 
"to provide adequate service," "to minimize environmental 
degradation," "to minimize social disruption," and "to 
minimize adverse health and safety effects." Most of them 
can be identified on the basis of past decision-making (or 
the criticism of that decision-making) and from the siting 
literature. Certainly an extensive list of impacts that 
might be (and for nuclear power plants in the United States, 
must be) accounted for appears in U S A E C  G u i d e  4.2 (1973). 
The set of objectives should have several properties: 
it should be c o m p l e t e ,  in the sense that it contains all 
important considerations on which a decision has impacts; it 
should be n o n - r e d u n d a n t  in the sense that "double-counting" 
is minimized, and it should be of min imum s i z e  to facilitate 
analysis. 
Hierarchies of objectives exist; it is only at the lowest 
level that objectives become specific enough for one to grap- 
ple with them analytically. At high levels are such objectives 
as those cited above, which are too abstract to use in an 
actual decision. In constructing their hierarchy, one attempts 
to structure objectives so that each highest-level objective 
comprises sub-objectives which fully describe its important 
aspects and yet can be dealt with more straightforwardly. For 
example, within or below the objective "minimize environmental 
degradation" might be the sub-objectives "minimize adverse 
impact on aqueous life forms," "minimize adverse impact on 
terrestrial life forms," and "minimize aesthetic degradation 
of landscape and adverse aesthetics of water and air pollution" 
(Figure 8). Specification of sub-objectives not only facili- 
tates analytical treatment, but also c l a r i f i e s  and d e f i n e s  
the upper-level objective for the purpose of analysis. Thus 
care must be taken to assure that the substrata of the objec- 
tives hierarchy do actually meet the intentions of the analyst 
or decision-maker. One mechanism for constructing the objec- 
tives hierarchy is to ask whether or not sub-objectives do 
completely describe upper-level objectives, and if they do not 
what additional sub-objectives must be provided so that they 
do. 
It is not our purpose here to dwell on the question of 
how inclusive or finely divided the objectives hierarchy 
should be; this problem is treated elsewhere (e.g., Manheim 
and Hall, 1967; Keeney and Raiffa, 197X). Certainly, however, 
all sub-objectives that may change the result of analysis must 
be included, although sometimes they may be treated in sets 
to facilitate quantification (Ting, 1971). In the end, the 
point at which formalization stops is a judgemental problem. 
2. Attributes 
Since objectives, even at lower levels in the hierarchy, 
are usually not measurable concepts, indices must be specified 
over which impacts can be scaled; these are called attributes 
in the present paper. Given the sub-objective "minimize 
thermal pollution to receiving waters," a typical attribute 
might be "increase in temperature of receiving waters in 
degrees centigrade." Listings of typically applied attributes 
may be found in USAEC (1973) and in Keeney and Nair (1974). 
With each lowest-level objective some attribute is associated, 
which itself may be either a scalar or vector. 
Individual attributes must be, in the terms of Keeney and 
Raiffa (197X), c o m p r e h e n s i v e  and m e a s u r a b l e .  Comprehensive- 
ness is the property that the level of impact as measured on 
Objectives 
provide adequate 
service 
Attributes 
minimize social 
disruption 
minimize adverse 
health and safety 
effects 
Figure 8 
Example of an Objectives Hierarchy 
an attribute fully expresses the degree to which the associated 
objective is achieved; measurability is the property that 
predictions can be made about the impact of a proposed site 
and technology alternative in terms of that attribute, and that 
the objective function (i.e., desirability) over values of the 
attribute can also be assessed. 
The s a t  of attributes should also display two properties, 
non-redundancy  and minimum s i z e .  The set should be non- 
redundant so that impacts are not double-counted (e.g., see 
McKean, 1958) and of minimum si-ze for analytical tractability. 
The set of attributes associated with the objectives 
hierarchy and each attribute itself do not uniquely follow 
from the objectives, and only with a small fraction of the 
objectives considered do attributes immediately suggest them- 
selves. Thus the selection of attributes may itself affect 
the outcome of analysis; one is well advised to proceed with 
great care and to assess retrospectively the sensitivity of 
analytical results to attribute selection. 
Attributes that do follow immediately from an objective 
are said to be n a t u r a l  attributes. For example, if one sub- 
objective were to "minimize 'fish kill'," a natural attribute 
would be "number of fish killed." When an attribute does not 
follow immediately from the objective, as is normally the 
case, a proxy  or s u r r o g a t e  attribute must be employed. For 
example, one might associate the attribute "parts per million 
of chemical contaminant Z" or "BOD" with the objective "mini- 
mize water pollution." These are not direct measures of the 
water quality the associated objective deals with, but rather 
are correlates, and may be chosen either because the primary 
property is inherently unmeasurable or because the natural 
measure is analytically intractable. To specify water pollu- 
tion adequately, for example, would require a vector attribute 
of large dimension, so large that it could not be used in 
analysis. 
A second reason for choosing a proxy attribute is that 
data may be more easily obtainable for it than for an attrib- 
ute that seems to follow more naturally. This may be due to 
ways in which data have been historically collected or aggre- 
gated, because certain types of monitoring are cheaper or 
quicker than others, or because it is easier to specify the 
objective function over some attributes than others. In 
cost-benefit analysis and other methods which use money as 
a measure of desirability, this increased ease may arise 
because some attributes have closer analogs in the market- 
place than others; and in methods such as utility analysis 
which use subjective valuations of desirability, because 
individuals find it easier to think about certain measures 
of impacts than about others. 
In siting problems impacts arise for which even proxy 
attributes cannot be identified, either because adequate 
indices have yet to be developed for very complex phenomena, 
or because the impact seems inherently non-quantifiable. In 
such cases scenarios are often specified in qualitative terms 
and values of desirability assessed directly over the scenarios. 
This technique is receiving increasing attention in problems 
of facility siting, particularly with aesthetic impacts such 
as visual quality of the landscape (Jones et al., 1974; 
Burnham et al., 1974). At present these approaches generally 
specify a rating scale associated with adverbal descriptions 
and scenarios, rate impacts of contending alternatives along 
that scale, and subsequently assign desirabilities to the 
scale. As this work proceeds, proxy attributes or scales 
may be developed which better lend themselves to quantified 
description (Holling, 1973) . 
Money is often taken as an attribute with which to measure 
the impacts of site technology pairs. Indeed, with such meth- 
ods as cost-benefit analysis there is a strong bias towards 
e x p r e s s i n g  as many i m p a c t s  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  monetary terms s i n c e  
impac t s  a r e  c o a l e s c e d  i n  monetary u n i t s .  The re  i s  n o t h i n g  
improper  a b o u t  t h i s  approach ,  a s  l o n g  a s  i m p a c t s  can  b e  r e a d i l y  
and comprehens ive ly  e x p r e s s e d  i n  monetary  u n i t s .  O f t e n ,  
however,  money i s  used  n o t  a s  t h e  a t t r i b u t e  o f  impac t ,  b u t  
r a t h e r  a s  t h e  measure  o f  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  an  impact  which i s  
i t s e l f  measured a l o n g  a n o t h e r  s c a l e - - f o r  example,  a  monetary 
v a l u e  i s  a s s i g n e d  t o  e a c h  f i s h  k i l l e d  by p o l l u t i o n .  A s  d e s i r -  
a b i l i t y  may be  e x p r e s s e d  i n  any c o n s i s t e n t  u n i t ,  a g a i n  t h e r e  
i s  n o t h i n g  i n n a t e l y  improper  i n  t h i s  approach .  However, some 
u n i t s ,  such  a s  money, may have  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h i n  t h e  
measure i t s e l f  which are n o t  s h a r e d  by wha teve r  o n e  i s  t r y i n g  
t o  measure;  t h e  a n a l y s t  must  be c a r e f u l  t h a t  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  
measure n o t  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  phenomenon a r e  n o t  employed i n  
t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  i s  an  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  which 
w i l l  be deve loped  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
3 .  O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o n s  
W e  have  a l r e a d y  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r -  
i s t i c  of  e v a l u a t i o n  me thodo log ies  i s  t h e  form o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n .  W e  now t u r n  a t t e n t i o n  t o  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h  one  from a n o t h e r .  F i g u r e  9 l i s t s  
t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s .  
D e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  a n  impac t  may be  measured t o  a n  o r d i n a l ,  
i n t e r v a l ,  o r  r a t i o  s c a l e  ( a  b r i e f  r e v i e w  o f  s c a l i n g  t h e o r y  i s  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  Appendix 111). Admiss ib le  o p e r a t i o n s  o n  measure- 
ments  o f  d e s i r a b i l i t y  depend on t h e  s c a l e  used .  I f  d e s i r a b i l -  
i t y  i s  measured t o  a n  o r d i n a l  s c a l e ,  a s  w i t h  some m a t r i x  
methods,  t h e n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  a d d i t i o n  and  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a g g r e g a t i o n  a r e  n o t  p e r m i s s i b l e .  Thus,  aggre-  
g a t i n g  o r d i n a l  d a t a  y i e l d s  numbers whose r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t o  o n e  
a n o t h e r  have  no meaning. I f  d e s i r a b i l i t y  i s  measured t o  an  
i n t e r v a l  s c a l e ,  t h e n  r a t i o s  o f  d e s i r a b l e  t o  a d v e r s e  i m p a c t s  
have  no meaning. One i s  g e n e r a l l y  r e t i c e n t  a b o u t  making 
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Characteristics of Objective Functions 
stronger assumptions than one must, but practical advantage 
can be realized by defining desirability to a higher scale 
than is theoretically necessary. ~ecisions among alternatives 
having multi-attribute but deterministic impacts require only 
that desirability be measured to an ordinal scale, and in 
fact Major (1974) has done so in water resources location prob- 
lems. In practice, however, it may be much easier to assess 
and computationally handle desirability if it is measured to 
an interval or ratio scale. Of course, this ease of applica- 
tion is bought with more restrictive assumptions. 
The level of scaling to which impacts are measured and 
that to which desirability is measured need. not be the same. 
For example, financial costs of a project are measured in 
monetary units, that is by a ratio scale, yet the desirability 
of levels of cost may be only an interval measure. On the 
other hand, impacts such as visual aesthetics may be measured 
only to an ordinal or even nominal scale, yet the desirability 
may be measured to an interval scale, or even a ratio scale 
(e. g., "willingness-to-pay") . 
Given an interval or ratio scaling for desirability over 
one attribute, the objective function may be linear or non- 
linear (Figure 10) .  Assuming that each increment of impact is 
just as important as every other increment leads to linearity, 
as when one assigns a unit cost and multiplies by the number 
of units. Linearity means constant marginal rate of changes 
of desirability with unit increases in impact. 
The desirability of impacts measured over multiple attri- 
butes may be either independent or non-independent. Stated 
another way, the level of desirability of an impact versus 
other impacts may or may not depend on the levels of the other 
impacts. For example, the d-ecrease in desirability caused by 
a unit increase in project cost may or may not depend on the 
level of environmental impacts. If the unit cost increase is 
DESIRABILITY OF IMPACT LEVELS 
c o n s i d e r e d  less i m p o r t a n t  f o r  a  p r o j e c t  w i t h  v e r y  l ow  env i - .  
r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  t h a n  f o r  o n e  w i t h  h i g h  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s ,  
t h e n  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t i e s  are n o n - i n d e p e n d e n t ;  t h e y  d o  n o t  f o l l o w  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
B ( c o s t ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s )  = B ( c o s t )  + 9 ( e n v i r .  e f f e c t s )  
I n d e p e n d e n c e  among t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t i e s  o f  i m p a c t s  mus t  b e  d i s t i n -  
g u i s h e d  f rom t e c h n i c a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  among them.  Two i m p a c t s  
s u c h  as v i s u a l  a e s t h e t i c s  a n d  h e a t  release may b e  t e c h n i c a l l y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  i n  t h a t  t h e  b e a u t y  ( o r  l a c k  t h e r e o f )  o f  a f a c i l i t y  
m i g h t  p l a y  no  p a r t  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p o l l u t a n t s  r e l e a s e d ,  o r  
v i c e  v e r s a ;  w h i l e  t h e  m a r g i n a l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
p o l l u t i o n  may de pe nd  on  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  v i s u a l  a e s t h e t i c s  
o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  two i m p a c t s  s u c h  as  c o s t  and  
p o l l u t i o n  release may b e  t e c h n i c a l l y  d e p e n d e n t  b u t  p r e f e r -  
e n t i a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t ;  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  a u n i t  d e c r e a s e  i n  
p o l l u t i o n  release m i g h t  b e  t h e  same i f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  c o s t s  
$1.0  m i l l i o n  o r  $10 m i l l i o n .  T h i s  i s  a  s i m p l e  b u t  i m p o r t a n t  
d i s t i n c t i o n .  
I f  a n  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  s p e c i f i e s  l i n e a r  c h a n g e s  i n  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  a nd  i n d e p e n d e n c e  be tw een  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t i e s  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  i m p a c t s ,  t h e n  t h e  m a r g i n a l  r a t e  o f  p r e f e r -  
e n t i a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  be t we en  i m p a c t s  i s  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  a l l  
i m p a c t  l e v e l s .  T h i s  would i m p l y ,  f o r  examp le ,  t h a t  i f  o n e  
w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f a c i l i t y  c o s t  f rom $10 ,000  t o  
$ 1 0 ,1 0 0  t o  l o w e r  e f f l u e n t  p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  f r o m  2 %  
t o  1%, t h e n  o n e  would  b e  e q u a l l y  w i l l i n g  t o  i n v o k e  a c o s t  
i n c r e a s e  o f  $10 t o  $110 t o  r e a l i z e  a p o l l u t i o n  d e c r e a s e  f rom 
1 0 %  t o  9 % .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  o n e  w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  c o s t  
by a l m o s t  $100 t o  r e a l i z e  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  p o l l u t i o n  o f  f r o m  
1 . 5 %  t o  l . O % ,  t h e n  o n e  s h o u l d  b e  w i l l i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  c o s t  by  
a n o t h e r  $100 ( a n d  n o  more )  t o  r e a l i z e  a f u r t h e r  r e d u c t i o n  t o  
0 . 5 % .  
Another characteristic of objective functions is whether 
they reduce evaluation to a single index. In sther words, 
are all impacts aggregated? Methods such as cost-benefit 
analysis do aggregate, others, such as   is hop's Factor Profile 
(1972), do not. This represents a philosophical distinction 
between methods. Although human beings certainly do aggregate 
in reaching decisions, and politicians or decision-makers must 
aggregate in any public decision, the issue of dispute is 
whether or not this may be done explicitly and analytically 
or only through judgement. Adherents to the former position 
would say that only in explicitly aggregating can one recog- 
nize underlying assumptions and possible biases; adherents 
to the latter, that the judgemental process of aggregation is 
so complex that simplified analytical procedures cannot do 
justice to its full richness and texture. Both arguments have 
merit. Empirical evidence in experimental psychology 
(Edwards and Tversky, 1967) would indicate that even the 
rigorous constructs of rational decision-making represented 
by utility theory and Bayesian probability does not always 
perform as well as human judgement. It is difficult to know 
from historical records whether such theory would have improved 
decisions made with respect to civil works development (or 
anything else for that matter). On the other hand, falling 
back on the sanctity of judgement does open the door to personal 
biases, and perhaps more importantly to the attempt to grapple 
intuitively with more impacts than one can remember at any one 
time. Between these extremes is the idea of aggregating 
impacts at the sub-objective level in the objectives hierarchy 
(e-g., aggregating all environmental impacts), and judgementally 
aggregating across main objectives. This course has the advan- 
tage that political decision-makers, while being wary of explic- 
itly weighting impacts against one another--for example, envir- 
onmental against financial--for fear of political repercussions, 
may be willing to explicitly weight different environmental 
impacts with respect to one another. 
Objective functions also d-iffer in how they treat uncer- 
tainty in impact predictions. Uncertainty enters predictions 
in two ways: it may arise from the uncertainty of future 
conditions such as population density or geophysical phenomena 
(e.g., floods, earthquakes, tornados), or from an inability to 
predict (i.e., from lack of knowledge). Inadequate information, 
e.g., on health effects of radiation, is of the latter type. 
In terms of the siting decision these two types of uncertainty 
have identical consequences and are therefore the same. An 
objective function may either treat uncertainty analytically 
or leave it as an external for later consideration. In any 
event, to account adequately for the true net desirability 
of feasible alternatives, an objective function must explicitly 
(whether or not analytically) account for uncertainty. 
Finally, objective functions differ in the degree to which 
they are "objective." In the sense we use the term here it 
means that the analyst's influence on measures of desirability 
is small. Plan evaluations are always subjective to the degree 
that they depend on the preferences of people, whether a small 
group of policy makers or the entire population. However, 
measures may depend to some extent on non-enumerated inter- 
pretations of the analyst, and this is what we take to be 
lack of objectivity. By this rule elections and many types of 
market data would be classified as almost purely objective, 
since little interpretation of the analyst is involved. Color 
coding schemes (e.g., Goeller, 1974) and the like are highly 
non-objective. 
4. Assessment 
All methods of evaluation which would compare favorable 
and unfavorable impacts of proposed facility sitings to arrive 
at some ranking rest ultimately on how the assessments of 
desirability are made. That is, they depend at their founda- 
tion on the procedure for collecting desirability data. We 
have already spoken of attributes as scales along which the 
impacts of a project can be measured; we must also speak of 
how to associate desirabilities with those scalings. 
All assessment techniques infer desirability from behav- 
ior, whether it is expressed in the market-place or in replies 
to an analyst's questions. All assessment techniques make 
assumptions about the interrelationships of desirability, and 
then use the structure that derives from those assumptions to 
draw inferences from empirical data. Very roughly, analysts 
fall into one of two groups with respect to their philosophy 
of assessment. The philosophy of the first springs from 
economic planning theory and views assessment as inference 
from market data; the second, from sociology and "systems 
analysis" and views assessment as inference from the direct 
replies to an interviewer's questions. While these two views 
might be taken merely as opposite ends of a continuum, it is 
of interest to look at each in isolation. 
A. Market Approaches 
In a free-enterprise economy it is assumed that the 
desirability (or utility in an economic sense) of a commodity 
is reflected directly in the amount of money people are will- 
ing to spend for it at the margin. This is a strength of the 
market-place and the justification for using market prices 
in evaluating impacts of decisions. For direct impacts of 
siting, this approach to desirability valuation worlts well; 
we have substantial experience with it and understand its 
pitfalls. Further, the analyst's subjective input is mini- 
mized relative to other evaluation techniques, and is rela- 
tively easy to discern. Thus there are strong arguments for 
its use. 
Briefly, market approaches first use the set of techno- 
logical relations to predict impacts along a set of attributes 
(which need not be monetary units), then associate levels of 
impact on these attributes with monetary values. For example, 
if an impact attribute were "change of estuary temperature 
in "F," one would subsequently associate some monetary cost 
or benefit with each degree of temperature change. The map- 
ping from attribute to money need not be linear, although 
in practice it often is. The assignment of monetary units 
derives from market data either directly or indirectly, and 
a spectrum of indirect techniques has been developed (e.g., 
Dorfmsn, 1965; Layard, 1972; Kendall, 1971) .3 Ilost of these 
techniques, however, have been developed to evaluate indirect 
benefits of a project, while at present techniques for han- 
dling indirect costs are perhaps insufficient for an adequate 
accounting (Joskow, 1974; Ross, 1974). 
The deficiencies of market approaches, which have often 
been discussed in the cost-benefit literature (e.g., Dorfman, 
1965), are summarized below. 
1. Desirabilities of "non-market" objectives, such as 
equity, flexibility in future options, and "balanced" regional 
growth, cannot be evaluated and thus remain external to the 
analysis. 4 
3~hese methods include shadow prices and opportunity costs, 
compensation costs, willingness-to-pay for or to avoid similar 
impacts, cost of providing benefits in other ways, and the like. 
'one could argue, of course, that desirability can be 
expressed in monetary as well as any other units; so the degree 
to which these objectives are met can be associated with monetary 
desirability. However, this merely transforms the process to one 
of direct assessment, using money as a scale; it no longer 
remains a market approach. 
2. The use of monetary units implicitly assumes certain 
interrelationships about desirability, whether they are 
intended or not--specifically, linearity over money, inde- 
pendence among impacts, and constant marginal rates of prefer- 
ential substitution among impacts. 
3. Some impacts are very difficult to evaluate because 
existing market mechanisms are distorted or non-existent 
(e.g., environmental impacts, health impacts), or because we 
have no experience with them. 
4. Market approaches distort the real desirabilities 
of impacts toward their market-like facets. The real undesir- 
ability of water pollution, for example, may be only partly 
captured by its economic implications; similar arguments can 
be applied to reduction of mortality rate, regional develop- 
ment, and other impacts. 
B. Direct Assessment 
Direct approaches go straight to individuals and by 
means of questionnaires, simple games, and related techniques 
infer desirability of impacts. These approaches have been 
developed primarily in the literature of social research and 
public opinion surveying (e.g., Hansen et al., 1953; Hyman, 
1954), and in that of applied decision theory (e.g., Raiffa, 
1968). 
Opinion sampling is well known, and has well-known pit- 
falls and biases (Webb et al., 1972); in general these need 
not be enlarged upon here. Opinion sampling yj.elds qualita- 
tive sentiments about the desirabilities of impacts, and most 
often treats feelings about each type of impact in isolation. 
(Question: "How would you like to live next to a new highway?" 
Answer: "Not much.") Often, this means that the results of 
opinion surveys are difficult to interpret; only in rare cases 
do they yield quantitative data. The results of opinion 
s u r v e y s  do  g i v e  t h e  a n a l y s t  o r  p o l i c y  maker a  good g e n e r a l  
i d e a  o f  t h e  s e n t i m e n t s  o f  g r o u p s  i n v o l v e d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  iden -  
t i f y i n g  i n t e r e s t s  ( C o l l i n s ,  1 9 7 3 ) .  
A t  t h e  o t h e r  end  o f  t h e  spec t rum o f  d i r e c t  a p p r o a c h e s  
i s  t h e  method o f  " p r e f e r e n c e  a s s e s s m e n t "  which h a s  been  d e v e l -  
oped i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  a p p l i e d  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  ( e - g . ,  R a i f f a ,  
1 9 6 8 ) .  T h i s  approach  i s  o r i e n t e d  toward  evok ing  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
s t a t e m e n t s  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  i m p a c t s  and  t r a d e - o f f s  among 
i m p a c t s .  The method f o l l o w s  from t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  
assumed i n  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s ,  which i n  t h a t  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  
c a l l e d  a  " u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n "  ( S e c t i o n  V I ) .  A c c e p t i n g  t h e  
axioms o f  p r e f e r e n c e  upon which u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  i s  b a s e d  
(Appendix V 1 . B )  l e a d s  t o  an  i n t e r v a l  s c a l i n g  o f  d e s i r a b i l i t y  
whose m a t h e m a t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  can  b e  d -e r ived .  These  p r o p e r -  
t i e s  o f t e n  a l l o w  p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  a  r a n g e  o f  impac t  l e v e l s  
t o  be  e s t i m a t e d  by making a  s m a l l  number o f  measurements .  
The p r o c e d u r e  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  i s  based  
on a s k i n g  s u b j e c t s  t o  se lec t  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  hypo- 
t h e t i c a l  gambles  (Appendix V 1 . A ) .  By p r e s e n t i n g  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
gambles  w i t h  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e d  outcomes and by v a r y i n g  l e v e l s  
o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  "winning"  and  " l o s i n g , "  o n e  
c a n  have  t h e  s u b j e c t  make d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  f o r c e  him t o  i m p l i c -  
i t l y  e x p r e s s  m u l t i - i m p a c t  d e s i r a b i l i t y ;  o n e  c a n  t h e n  back-  
f i g u r e  p r e f e r e n c e  measu res  r e f l e c t e d  i n  h i s  answers .  Normally,  
a  c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  redundancy  i s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n i n g ,  
and t h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  i t e r a t e d  u n t i l  i n t e r n a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  a g r e e s  w i t h  
a r e  d e v e l o p e d .  
The s t r e n g t h s  o f  d i r e c t  methods v i s  2 v i s  marke t  
a p p r o a c h e s  i s  t h a t  t h e y  a l l o w  t r e a t m e n t  o f  i m p a c t s  w i t h  which 
w e  have  l i t t l e  o r  no economic e x p e r i e n c e ;  t h a t  t h e y  r e f l e c t  
o p i n i o n s  and f e e l i n g s  which a r e  c u r r e n t  (whereas  marke t  d a t a  
a r e  o f t e n  y e a r s  o l d ) ;  and  t h a t  t h e y  a l l o w  t r e a t m e n t  o f  a s  y e t  
unrealized impacts, although the whole question of "hypo- 
theticalities" in public or quasi-public decision-making 
remains a sticky problem. 
Opinion surveys and the more quantitative methods of 
decision analysis are end-points of a spectrum of methods, 
whose use depends on available time, money, and resources, 
and on the level of precision required. The question resolves 
to one of investment in public sampling vs. error in resulting 
quantifications of desirability. The latter end of that spec- 
trum consists of methods that bring out quantitative trade- 
offs among the desirabilities of impacts; the data one 
receives from this end of the spectrum are much more useful 
than those from the other end, but cost more. 
Several important deficiencies of direct approaches are 
listed below. 
1. The ordering and even the wording of questions intro- 
duces bias errors of whose magnitude and direction the analyst 
is ignorant. 
2. Subjects may have preferences for impacts but be 
unable or unwilling to verbalize them. 
3. Even if, after great introspection, a subject can 
verbalize his preferences, are these the same as would be 
inferred from his behavior (i.e., in action) and how could 
you ever find out? If it is not, which is more proper? 
Clearly one would be measuring something different other than 
what is measured by market approaches. 
4. Cost constrains the number of individuals interviewed 
and the depth of the interviews. This leads to larger "esti- 
mation errors" than market approaches which generally have 
larger data bases. 
5. Assessment techniques involve hypothetical gambles 
and therefore depend not only on subjective preference but on 
subjective probability as well. 
6. Non-naive subjects sometimes deliberately mislead 
interviewers in the hope of biasing decisions toward their 
true preferences (i.e., "gamesmanship," or what Swain 
(personal communication) calls the "garden path effect"). 
C. Combined Approaches 
There is no reason why market and direct approaches 
cannot be combined for a better description of desirability 
than either approach leads to in itself. This is generally 
not done because analysts approach problems with a prechosen 
decision methodology, carrying with it a philosophy of 
assessment. 
While work is needed to develop a combined approach, 
such an approach might use market techniques to measure 
economic impacts or impacts that are easily and justifiably 
treated with market data, and direct assessment to measure 
non-market impacts (and those which are difficult to measure 
behavi-orally, such as mortality rate). Sets of assessments 
could overlap, and could be calibrated with respect to each 
other to reduce bias errors. A second approach would be 
based as this one, but use market data as prior information 
in the Bayesian sense, and modify those data by direct assess- 
ments in the normal Bayesian scheme of updating (Baecher, 
1975). 
APPENDIX 
Neasurement  Theorv  
One a s s i g n s  numbers and symbols  t o  e v e n t s  and o b j e c t s  
b e c a u s e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among p r o p e r l y  d e f i n e d  
numbers and symbols  have  been  e x t e n s i v e l y  s t u d i e d  and  a r e  
w e l l  known. S i n c e  some o f  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  may b e  s h a r e d  
by t h e  e v e n t s  and o b j e c t s ,  one  may by a n a l o g y  i n f e r  p r o p e r t i e s  
o f  t h e  e v e n t s  and  o b j e c t s  t h a t  have  n o t  been  o b s e r v e d  o r  a r e  
n o t  immed ia t e ly  o b v i o u s .  However, one  must  b e  e x p l i c i t  a b o u t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among t h e  e v e n t s  and o b j e c t s ,  b e c a u s e  numbers 
and  symbols  may b e  r e l a t e d  i n  ways i n  which t h e  e v e n t s  and 
o b j e c t s  a r e  n o t  (Ackof f ,  1962)  . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p s  one  assumes  t o  h o l d  be tween  t h e  e v e n t s  
and o b j e c t s  one  a s s i g n s  numbers t o  a r e  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  s c a l e  
u sed .  The f o l l o w i n g  f o u r  s c a l e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d .  5  
1. Nominal S c a l e s  g r o u p  e l e m e n t s  i n t o  c l a s s e s ;  f o r  
example ,  a  f a c i l i t y  s i t e  migh t  b e  e i t h e r  i n l a n d  o r  
c o a s t a l .  
2.  O r d i n a l  S c a l e s  r a n k  e l e m e n t s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  some 
d y a d i c  r e l a t i o n s h p  ( i . e . ,  " g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s  t h a n "  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) .  The P , l e r ca l l i  s c a l e  o f  e a r t h q u a k e  
i n t e n s i t y  i s  an  o r d i n a l  s c a l e .  
3 .  I n t e r v a l  S c a l e s  i n t r o d u c e  a  u n i t  o f  measurement ;  
d i s t a n c e s  be tween  e l e m e n t s  on t h e  s c a l e  r e p r e s e n t  
d i s t a n c e s  between them i n  some r e l a t i o n s h i p  d e f i n e d  
o v e r  them. The C e n t i g r a d e  t e m p e r a t u r e  s c a l e  i s  an 
example .  
' s t e v e n s  (1959)  and  S t e v e n s  & G a l a n t e r  (1958)  s u g g e s t  
o t h e r s ,  b u t  t h e y  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r e s t .  
4. Ratio Scales introduce the property of absolute 
zero in addition to interval properties; ratios of 
scale values represent ratios in the relationship 
defined over the elements. Money is a ratio scale. 
The scale to which events or objects are measured also 
defines permissible mathematical and statistical operations 
on the resulting measurements (Table 1). Because the 
scale specifies allowable operations, the operations required 
by an evaluation methodology dictate the level of scaling 
required. Simple comparison of deterministic impacts requires 
only ordinal scaling (e.g., indifference curves--Section VII); 
analytical inclusion of uncertainty requires interval scaling 
(e.g., von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility--Section VII); ratios 
of desired to adverse impacts require ratio scaling (e.g., 
cost-benefit analysis--Section V). Applying inadmissible 
operations to measurements result in numbers whose relation- 
ships to one another have no meaning. For example, if 
different alternatives have impacts against some objective 
whose desirability we can ordinally scale (best, second best, 
..., worst), and if we assign the numbers l,2, ..., n to 
those desirabilities, then we cannot add the desirabilities 
together nor weight them to form an aggregate average. 
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IV. Cost-Benefit 
Ever since DUPU~L observed that more general benefits 
accrue to society than are manifested in revenues, decision- 
makers have been searching for techniques that can include 
all of these in one analysis. Perhaps the most-used tech- 
nique is cost-benefit analysis. Here, a project is analyzed 
by summing economic benefits to all of society and comparing 
them with economic costs; if the former exceed the latter, 
then the project is either deemed favorable for investment 
or ranked against alternatives. Cost-benefit has been 
subject to debate and refinement for decades. The purpose 
here is not to present the spectrum of opinion, but to review 
some basic or implicit assumptions of the technique, to 
discuss the ease of applying it for site evaluation, and to 
compare it to other methods of analysis. 6 
During the New Deal era, cost-benefit analysis was 
adopted in the United States as a tool to evaluate public 
works programs. The returns on these projects were often 
insufficient to interest private investment, but were 
attractive to the government because total benefits often 
exceeded costs. The Flood Control Act of 1936 institution- 
alized the use of cost-benefit analysis, which has remained 
the primary tool for evaluating public works programs ever 
since. This Act set the important precedent for U.S. govern- 
ment policy that benefits "to whomsoever they accrue" should 
exceed costs, and di2 not require an enumeration of the 
recipients. Since the Act, the U.S. government has made 
major efforts to incorporate modifications and extensions 
into the general procedure (see U.S. studies of 1965, 1971), 
'&lore detailed reviews and discussions of cost-benefit 
theory and its problems are given in Prest and Turvey (1955), 
Mishan (1971) , Maass et al. (1962) , Plarglin (1967) , ~ckstein 
(1958), and UNIDO (1972). 
and cost-benefit techniques have been applied to decisions 
in such disparate fields as public health, outdoor recreation, 
and defense, and in both the public and private sectors 
(Dorfman, 1965). 
In cost-benefit analysis the only criterion of decision 
is economic efficiency. This criterion has traditionally 
been taken either to be the ratio 
or the difference 
B-C = 1 bi 
where the bi's and the cils are benefits and costs, respective- 
ly, expressed in monetary terms. 
Benefits are commonly separated into direct and indirect. 
The former include the immediate products or services of the 
project, often expressed by direct revenues; the latter 
include all other benefits accruing from the proposed project, 
such as increases in regional economic development, flood 
protection, etc. Costs can be similarly divided, and again 
the summation includes both. 
When used to generate an ordinal ranking of plans, the 
alternative with the largest benefit to cost ratio or benefit 
less cost difference is preferred, followed by the one with 
the next-highest, and so on. In public expenditure practice, 
however, cost-benefit analysis often serves as an admissibility 
test in which all alternatives with a B/C < 1.0 are screened 
out and decisions among those which remain are made on other 
bases (Sewell, 1973) . When an ordinal ranking is generated, 
the benefit/cost ratio and benefit-cost difference can lead 
to different orderings of alternatives, as the ratio criterion 
favors low-cost alternatives (disregarding economies of scale) 
while the difference criterion favors high-cost ones (Figure 
11). Given several projects with constant total budget, the 
ratio criterion can easily be shown to maximize net return; 
while for any one project with no cost constraint, the dif- 
ference criterion obviously maximizes net benefit. 
Siting decisions are different from the usual budget 
allocation problem in that the value of benefits is usually 
considered to be independent of the site considered. There- 
fore, after the decision has been made to build the facility, 
the problem is more nearly a cost minimization problem than 
a true cost-benefit problem. Perhaps this can best be char- 
acterized as a cost-effectiveness approach. 
The primary advantages of the cost-benefit technique 
relative to other decision tools are: 
1) It is conceptually simple and readily understandable, 
and decision-makers have experience in using it; 
2) It has a basis in general welfare theory, although 
it is normally used more pragmatically (Broadway, 
1974) ; 
3) It reduces multi-dimensional impacts to one scalar 
index for easy comparison of alternatives; 
4) It attempts to be objective, limiting the analyst's 
influence on the results. 
The disadvantages are: 
1) The use of monetary units for all impacts places 
restrictive assumptions on the preference structure 
and does not allow inclusion of more than one group's 
values or more than one averaging of "society's" 
values; 
2) It does not include many social objectives; 
3) It lacks a satisfactory way of treating uncertainties 
in impact predictions; 
BIC= CONST. 
COSTS = Z C ~  
(SITE A HAS A GREATER BENEFITKOST RATIO 
BUT LESSER BENEFIT-COST DIFFERENCE THAN 
SITE B ) 
FIGURE 11 
4) By reducing impacts to monetary units, it leads to 
market-like approaches to evaluation, which often 
involve complex schemes not fully capturing the 
true desirability of impacts. 
In cost-benefit analysis, all impacts are expressed in 
monetary units. Two restrictive and probably unrealistic 
assumptions about the preference structure result: 
1) Desirability is a linear function of impact level 
for each impact. 
2) The desirability of any impact level is independent 
of the levels of other impacts. 
These implicit assumptions result in restrictions on the 
marginal rate of substitution between impacts (i.e., it is 
assumed constant). 
The disadvantages listed as Nos. 2 and 4 deal with what 
are known in cost-benefit analysis as externalities. These 
are impacts that, while important, cannot be included in the 
decision analysis in ways which adequately reflect their true 
importance. Some of these are noise, health and safety im- 
pacts, environmental degradation, and social disruption. To 
the extent that externalities relate to important objectives, 
cost-benefit analysis is incomplete and can be only one of 
several factors in reaching a final decision. 
Economists have been clever in including in the cost- 
benefit framework impacts that would seem at first appearance 
to be inexpressible in monetary units (noise, for example; 
Heath, 1971). Often, however, such impacts are treated by 
establishing legal standards or constraints that must be met 
in decision-making rather than treating the impacts as merely 
another variable. This suggestion has been made by Joskow 
(1974) , for example, with respect to siting nuclear facilities. 
The approach is not at all satisfactory, because it simply 
transfers responsibility for decisions to another place, in 
this case to regulatory agencies. If they are making their 
standard-setting decisions with the same cost-benefit method- 
ology (see, e.g., Najone, 1974) we are still left with the 
problem. 
1. Equity 
Implicit in cost-benefit analysis is a d-isregard for the 
distribution of impacts. An alternative that greatly benefits 
a few people while adversely affecting many or even most, is 
perfectly admissible as long as its benefits to society as a 
whole exceed its costs. In siting decisions, these questions 
of equity refer to the distribution of effects both over the 
strata of society and over spatial groups. 
There have been many attempts to include questions of 
equity in the cost-benefit framework. A common approach is 
to list efficiency calculations alongside equity (and other 
"non-scientific" criteria) in presenting alternatives to 
decision-makers, who are then called on to make subjective 
comparisons. This approach was used by the Roskill Commission 
(1970) on siting the Third London Airport, and was recommended 
by the Water Resources Council (1971) for U.S. government 
projects. By including equity considerations in this manner, 
cost-benefit analysis becomes similar to some of the matrix 
methods discussed in the next section. 
Marglin (1962) suggests the use of constraints on costs 
and benefits accruing to groups. The problems with this 
method, however, are that constraints must be chosen arbi- 
trarily, and that there is no provision for trade-offs 
between efficiency and equity (Weisbrod, 1968). A second 
method is to apply weighting factors to benefits and costs 
for each group, and then take a weighted sum over all groups. 
Values of the first weights would correspond to values that 
groups themselves attach to changes in particular impacts, 
and the second set of weights would correspond to the impor- 
tance of each group having its preferences satisfied (i.e., 
p o l i t i c a l  w e i g h t s ) .  Weisbrod has  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t -  
i c a l  w e i g h t s  might  b e  i n f e r r e d  from p a s t  government d e c i s i o n s ,  7  
Weights  o f  t h i s  t y p e  assume independence  among t h e  g roups .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  many a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c o s t - b e n e f i t  
a n a l y s i s  s imply  i g n o r e  e q u i t y .  J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  a r e  
u s u a l l y  t a k e n  t o  be  (Layard ,  1971) : 
1. The s o - c a l l e d  "Hicks-Kald-or c r i t e r i o n , "  which s a y s  
t h a t  one s h o u l d  be  concerned o n l y  t h a t  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  c o u l d  
compensate  l o s e r s  even i f  i n  r e a l i t y  t h e y  d o n ' t ;  a  c o n c e p t  
o f t e n  ex tended  by t h e  c o n c e p t  t h a t  a d v e r s e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  
e f f e c t s  can  b e  undone by p u r e l y  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  p r o j e c t s ;  
2 .  The i m p r o p r i e t y  o f  u n d e r t a k i n g  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  com- 
p a r i s o n s  o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  v a l u e  o f  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s ;  
3. A m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  t e n d  t o  even o u t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s .  
2 .  U n c e r t a i n t y  
S i t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  i n v o l v e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
n o t  o n l y  t o  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  i m p a c t s ,  b u t  a l s o  t o  a  r a n g e  o f  
s o c i a l ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l ,  and even monetary  c o s t s ;  and any r a t i o -  
n a l  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s  must  p r o v i d e  a  means o f  accounting f o r  
them. U n c e r t a i n t i e s  r e s u l t  from ( a )  random e v e n t s ,  such  a s  
w e a t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s ,  f u t u r e  p o p u l a t i o n  l e v e l s ,  and equipment  
f a i l u r e s ,  and ( b )  l a c k  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  on long- term conse-  
quences .  A s  w e  have a l r e a d y  a rgued ,  t h e s e  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  
s i m i l a r l y .  
A s a t i s f a c t o r y  method o f  h a n d l i n g  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  c o s t -  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  h a s  y e t  t o  be  developed (Dorfman, 1 9 6 2 ) ,  
7 ~ h i s  method c i r c u m v e n t s  a  v a l u e  judgement by t h e  a n a l y s t  
by u s i n g  t h e  v a l u e  judgement o f  p o l i t i c i a n s .  The i n t e r e s t i n g  
o b j e c t i o n  h a s  been made by Layard (1972) t h a t  i f  p a s t  d e c i s i o n s  
were c o n s i s t e n t  and r a t i o n a l ,  why n o t  c o n t i n u e  i n  t h e  same 
p r o c e s s ;  and i f  t h e y  were n o t ,  why pretend.  t h a t  t h e y  were? 
a l t h o u g h  s e v e r a l  methods  have  been  e x p l o r e d  and  a p p l i e d .  
Among t h e s e  a r e :  u s i n g  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e s  o f  in?;;acts, t r y i n g  
t o  a s s e s s  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s ,  and  u s i n g  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r s .  
The mos t  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  a p p r o a c h  i s  t o  u s e  a n  i m p a c t ' s  
e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  i n  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  c o r r e s p o n d s  
t o  l i n e a r  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  money i n  u n c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s ;  
w h i l e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  may b e  l e g i t i m a t e  o v e r  s m a l l  u n c e r t a i n t y  
r a n g e s ,  it i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  b e  l e g i t i m a t e  o v e r  l a r g e  o n e s .  Thus 
e x p e c t e d  mone ta ry  v a l u e  i s  n o t  t h e  same a s  e x p e c t e d  d e s i r -  
a b i l i t y ,  and  w e  have  t h e  i n t u i t i v e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t h a t  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n s  o f  p o s s i b l e  i m p a c t  v a l u e s  a r e  e q u a l l y  d e s i r a b l e  a s  
l o n g  a s  t h e i r  mean v a l u e s  a r e  t h e  same. The s e c o n d  a p p r o a c h  
i s  t o  s p e c i f y  a  c e r t a i n  i m p a c t  f o r  which one  would b e  i n d i f -  
f e r e n t  t o  t h e  c h o i c e  be tween  it and t h e  u n c e r t a i n  i m p a c t .  
Much o f  t h e  " r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n "  work i n  n u c l e a r  power u s e s  t h i s  
a p p r o a c h  (Otway e t  a l . ,  1971;  S t a r r ,  1 9 7 0 ) .  O f t e n ,  however ,  
c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  on an  ad h o e  b a s i s ,  and  
c a n n o t  b e  b a c k - f i g u r e d  u s i n g  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  and economic 
d a t a .  A c r i t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  app roach  i s  found  i n  
Dorfman (1962)  . A common h e u r i s t i c  t e c h n i q u e  i s  t o  d i s c o u n t  
t h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  o f  i m p a c t s  by some measu re  o f  t h e  u n c e r -  
t a i n t y :  a  t y p i c a l  f a c t o r  i s  (1 + k o ) - l  where  k  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  
c o n s t a n t  and  a i s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n .  
The drawbacks  o f  a l l  t h r e e  methods a r e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
s i m p l y  ru l e s -o f - thumb ( E c k s t e i n ,  1961;  Dorfman, 1962)  w i t h  
no sound t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s i s .  
V. M a t r i x  A ~ ~ r o a c h e s  
Given t h e  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  n a t u r e  o f  i m p a c t s  f rom s i t i n g  
l a r g e  f a c i l i t i e s  and  what  i s  s e e n  t o  b e  a n  i n h e r e n t  non- 
c o m p a r a b i l i t y  o f  i m p a c t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s ,  s e v e r a l  methods  
o f  p r o j e c t  e v a l u a t i o n  have  been  d e v e l o p e d  which l i s t  i m p a c t s  
s e p a r a t e l y  i n  a  t a b l e  o r  m a t r i x  ( F i g u r e  1 2 ) .  These  methods  
hope t o  c i r c u m v e n t  a p p a r e n t  n o n - c o m p a r a b i l i t i e s  by a l l o w i n g  
Sector and 
Instrumental Objective 
Differences ( £  m.) from Cublington 
Measure Cublington Foulness Nuthampstead Thurleigh 
6 Luton 
PRODUCERS OPERATORS 
A i r  and S u r f a c e  T r a n s p o r t  
B r i t i s h  A i r p o r t s  A u t h o r i t y  
Airport Construction 
Operating Costs 
A i r l i n e  O p e r a t o r s  
Meteorology 
Airspace Elovements 
Accident Hazards 
Highway A u t h o r i t i e s  
Capital Costs 
P u b l i c  T r a n s p o r t  A u t h o r i t y  
Capital Costs 
DISPLACED OR AFFECTED 
PRODUCERS 
D e f e n c e  £ 0 -29 -24 +32 
P u b l i c  S c i e n t i f i c  E s t a b l i s h m e n t s  £ 0 - 1 +2 0 +2 6 
P r i v a t e  A i r f i e l d s  £ 0 - 7 + 6 + 8 
S c h o o l s ,  H o s p i t a l s  & P a b l i e  A u t h o r i t y  £ 0 - 2 + 4 + 2 
B u i l d i n g s  
A g r i c u l t u r e  £ 0 + 4 + 9 + 3 
Commerce and I n d u s t r y  £ 0 + 2 + 1 + 2 
Producers: Total: £ 0 + 6 +4 8 +64 
CONSUMERS 
TRAVELLEKS A N D  FREIGHT 
SHIPPERS 
P a s s e n g e r s  
(a) On Surface: British residents 
: Foreign residents 
(b) In the Air (included in 1.2) 
F r e i g h t  S h i p p e r s  
O t h e r  T r a v e l Z e r s  (included in 2.1) 
DISPL,ACED OR AFFECTED 
CONSUMERS 
R e s i d e n t s  D i s p l a c e d  
R e s i d e n t s  Not  D i s p l a c e d  
-Noise: 55 NNI+ 
50-55 NNI 
45-50 NNI 
40-44 NNI 
35-40 NNI 
-Recreation 
RATEPAYERS, TAXPAYERS A N D  
GENERAL PUBLIC 
. -- 
Consumers: Total: E 0 +152 +81 + 6 
Overall Total: £ 0 +158 +129 +70 
Figure 12 
Balance Sheet of Development 
(after Lichfield, 1971) 
the decision-maker to choose a best decision alternative 
judgementally after reviewing the spectrum of differing 
impacts. 
While several "matrix" approaches have been developed, 
they spring from the same philosophy: impacts against dif- 
ferent types of objectives are inherently non-comparable; it 
is true that people do make decisions that require implicit 
trading-off of one type of impact for another, but schemes 
to analyze such trade-offs quantitatively invariably stumble 
over the necessary simplifying assumptions. While trade-off 
relations might be developed on subjectivist theory, as in 
utility theory, the analysis cannot do justice to the full 
complexity of judgemental decision-making, and some impacts 
of large facilities simply bar quantification. 
In this section we will present four groups of matrix 
techniques which embody a range of those proposed, and con- 
clude by summarizing the advantages and limitations of non- 
aggregating approaches to siting. 
1. Lichfield's Planning Balance Sheet 
Lichfield's (1968, 1971) planning balance sheet method 
is an outgrowth of cost-benefit analysis which received 
renewed attention in the wake of controversy over the Roskill 
Commission's analysis of sites for the Third London Airport. 
This method attempts to separate from one another both impacts 
considered inherently non-comparable, and those against dif- 
ferent groups within society. Typically, a planning balance 
sheet might look like that schematically illustrated in Fig- 
ure 12, in which monetary units are used for impacts that may 
be readily so quantified, and non-monetary units for the 
remainder. If an impact is judged to be non-quantifiable 
numerically it is assigned qualitive descriptions. Impacts 
expressed monetarily are aggregated as in normal cost-benefit 
analysis, and a decision is made judgemental1~- ,y weighting 
the net monetary cost or benefit against the spectrum of 
other impacts and their distribution across groups. 
The advantage of Lichfield's method over traditional 
cost-benefit is that it explicitly enumerates impacts that 
seem "unmeasurable" (and thus are not normally included) and 
specifies the distribution of impacts over affected groups. 
However, it gives no guidance to how these might be incor- 
porated in a decision, other than that impacts on groups 
might be weighted to account for equity considerations. 
2. Goals-Achievement Matrix 
The "goals-achievement" approach developed by Hill (1973) 
is perhaps the most widely publicized of the various matrix 
techniques. Hill uses the term goa l  in precisely the same 
way as we have used the term upperm os t  o b j e c t i v e ;  sub- 
objectives, lower in the hierarchy, he merely called o b j e c -  
t i v e s .  
The essence of the goals-achievement approach is to 
establish separate accounts for impacts generated by contend- 
ing sites and technologies as they bear against each important 
goal and each of several groups within society. Achievements 
toward each goal and impacts against each group are given 
weights on judgemental bases, and those levels of goal achieve- 
ment (multiplied by their appropriate weight) which are in 
commensurable units are combined, leaving a reduced but still 
multi-dimensional array to be reviewed in reaching a final 
decision. The method is one step closer to aggregation than 
simple impact display tables, but again breaks down when the 
number of unaggregated impacts becomes too large for intuitive 
treatment. 
The procedure for generating a goals-achievement matrix 
is the following. First, each goal of importance is identi- 
fied, and attributes with which to measure achievements 
against each is selected. If a quantitative index cannot be 
associated with each goal, a qualitative description of 
predicted impact is substituted. Second, weights are judge- 
mentally assigned to each goal on the basis of its importance; 
each population group affected by the proposed project is 
identified, and the importance of impacts on each group with 
respect to each goal is weighted. Finally, these are arranged 
in matrix format as shown in Figure 13 (in which capital 
letters represent costs and benefits, in a generic sense, 
accruing to each affected group). Costs and benefits with 
respect to each goal must be in similar units, and if these 
are quantified predictions, the weighted sum over all affected 
groups cen be formed yielding an aggregated impact with 
respect to the one goal. If all impacts can be expressed in 
commensurate units and if the aggregation over affected groups 
is "meaningful," then a "grand cost-benefit summation" is 
possible. 
The goals-achievement matrix, like other matrix approaches, 
includes no analytical way of treating uncertainty. Although 
Hill readily admits (1973, p. 27) that "uncertainty concern- 
ing anticipated consequences is best treated by probability 
formulation," the most that is currently done is to include 
ranges of possible impacts rather than point estimates. 
"In general, allowance for uncertainty should be made indi- 
rectly by use of conservative estimates, requirement of 
safety margins, continual feedback and adjustment and a risk 
component in the discount rate" (1973, p. 28). This does 
not seem satisfactory. 
To this point the goals-achievement matrix is only a 
vehicle for displaying predicted impacts of site and facility 
technology alternatives. Given this listing, how is a 
decision or ranking of alternatives made? Hill suggests 
three techniques of varying levels of aggregation. The 
simplest is just to let the decision-maker review the matrix 
and arrive judgementally at a decision; at this level the 
Goal 
Description 
Relative 
Weight 
Relative Relative Relative Relative 
Incidence Weight Costs Ben. Weight Costs Ben. Weight Costs Ben. b7eight Costs Ben. 
Group a 1 A D 5 E - 1 - N 1 Q R 
Group b 3 H - 4 - R 2 2 S T - - 
Group c 1 L J 3 - S 3 II - 1 V W 
Group d 2 - - 2 T - 4 - - 2 - - 
Group e 1 - K 1 - U 5 - P 1 - - 
C C C C 
Figure 13 
The Goals-Achievement Matrix 
(after Hill; 1973) 
method is primarily bookkeeping. The next level is to aggre- 
gate impacts using the weightings assigned to goal achieve- 
ment and group impact, but here the method adopts those very 
inadequacies it was developed to mitigate. According to 
Hill (p. 3 7 ) ,  "the combined weight of the objectives and their 
incidence is assigned to the measures of achievement of the 
objectives. The weighted indices of goals-achievement are 
then summed and the preferred plan among the alternatives 
compared is that with the largest index." Clearly, this 
approach differs little from traditional cost-benefit analysis 
except that units other than money may be employed and that 
relative weightings of goals may be specified explicitly 
rather than being hidden in specified monetary values. The 
explicit weighting of impacts on groups is similar to 
Lichfield's planning balance sheet and Weisbrod's (1968) 
suggestions for traditional cost-benefit analysis. 
The central problem with aggregation of impacts in this 
way is that it assumes interrelationships in the objective 
function (i.e., in the desirability of impacts relative to 
one another) that may not be reflected in reality. Namely, 
it assumes that the degree to which we should desire a certain 
level of an impact is independent of the levels of all other 
impacts, and of the level of that impact against that same 
goal relative to other groups; and is a linear function of 
absolute level with a defined zero point. It is not at all 
clear that these even approximate valid assumptions; and so 
the goals-achievement approach contributes little to over- 
coming the limitations of cost-benefit assumptions. 
Hill goes on to say that although not every impact may 
be scaled on cardinal indices, the goals-achievement method 
may be modified to handle ordinally scaled impacts. His 
proposed method would assign the value +1, 0, or -1 to each 
impact on each group, depending on whether it enhanced, left 
unchanged, or detracted from goal achievement. These 
o r d i n a Z  values would be combined by multiplying each by both 
the goal and the group weight and summing to determine a 
final aggregate index of goal attainment. This is blatantly 
erroneous: if impact data are specified to an ordinal scale 
they do not allow multiplication and addition, so the final 
index is meaningless. 
Hill's final proposal is based on Ackoff's (1962) notion 
of transformation functions which map one impact scale onto 
another, and approaches the concept of measurable utility 
which is treated in Section VI. Hill suggests that impacts 
that are measurable to either an interval or ratio scale be 
transformed onto one common scale through some (not neces- 
sarily linear) transformation. In the two-impact case this 
would mean expressing levels of one impact in units of the 
other. As the correspondence between increments of impacts 
is not necessarily constant over the ranges of those impacts, 
these transformations might not be linear. In the multi- 
impact case the easiest proposition might be to scale all 
impacts in terms of a single impact, perhaps money. In 
this case, Hill's proposal once again reduces to a form of 
cost-benefit analysis, except that non-linearities in the 
evaluation of impact levels would be allowed. This does not 
circumvent other assumptions of independence or allow one to 
treat analytically impacts defined to less than an interval 
scale, as discussed previously. Given that this approach 
attempts to express quantitatively trade-offs between the 
desirability of different impacts and non-linearities in the 
desirability of levels of one impact, there seems little 
reason not to go over entirely to a utility analysis, which 
makes few additional assumptions and is more theoretically 
sound. 
3 .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Impact  P l a t r i x  
Leopold e t  a l .  ( 1971)  o f  t h e  U.S. G e o l o g i c a l  Su rvey  have  
p r e s e n t e d  what  t h e y  c a l l  an  " e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  m a t r i x "  f o r  
u s e  i n  c o m p i l i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impac t  s t a t e m e n t s  a s  r e q u i r e d  
by t h e  Env i ronmen ta l  P o l i c y  A c t  o f  1969 .  T h i s  t e c h n i u u e  i s  
p r i m a r i l y  in tend .ed  t o  p r o v i d e  a  u n i f o r m  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  c o a l e s c -  
i n g  i m p a c t s  and  p r e s e n t i n g  them, r a t h e r  t h a n  b e i n g  a  d e c i s i o n -  
making t o o l  i n  i t s e l f .  A s  t h e  a u t h o r s  s t a t e  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n ,  
"The h e a r t  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  a  m a t r i x  which  
i s  g e n e r a l  enough t o  b e  used  a s  a  r e f e r e n c e  
c h e c k l i s t  o r  a  r e n i n d e r  o f  t h e  f u l l  r a n g e  
o f  a c t i o n s  and i m p a c t s  on t h e  env i ronmen t  
t h a t  may r e l a t e  t o  p roposed  a c t i o n s . "  
T h e i r  hope  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  " a  s y s t e m  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  and  
n u m e r i c a l  w e i g h t i n g  o f  p r o b a b l e  i m p a c t s "  which  would " n o t  
p roduce  a n  o v e r a l l  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r a t i n g  b u t  p o r t r a y s  many 
v a l u e  judgemen t s . "  
I n  e s s e n c e  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impac t  m a t r i x  i s  i n t e n d e d  
t o  be  a  t a b u l a r  summary o f  p r o j e c t  i m p a c t s  which would 
accompany e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impac t  s t a t e m e n t s .  But  a s  t h i s  method 
a t t e m p t s  t o  s c a l e  i m p a c t s ,  and  a s  some w o r k e r s  have  a t t e m p t e d  
t o  u s e  it a s  a  d e c i s i o n  t o o l ,  a  few remarks  a r e  i n  o r d e r .  
The m a t r i x  i s  c o n s t r u c t e d  by l i s t i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  a  p ro -  
posed  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h a t  m i g h t  p roduce  i m p a c t s  a l o n g  one  a x i s ,  
and t y p e s  o f  i m p a c t s  a l o n g  t h e  o t h e r  ( F i g u r e  1 4 ) .  I n  e a c h  
r e s u l t i n g  s q u a r e  o f  t h e  m a t r i x  w i t h  which s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p a c t s  
a r e  a s s o c i a t e d ,  two n u m e r i c a l  e n t r i e s  a r e  made: t h e  u p p e r ,  
a  measure  s c a l e d  on t h e  i n t e g e r  r a n g e  ( 1 , l O )  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  
magn i tude  o f  i m p a c t ;  and  t h e  l o w e r ,  a g a i n  a  measu re  on t h e  
i n t e g e r  r a n g e  ( 1 , 1 0 ) ,  i n d i c a t i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  i m p a c t s .  
Al though t h e s e  numbers a r e  a s s e s s e d  j u d g e m e n t a l l y ,  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e  t h e y  " s h o u l d  b e  . . .  b a s e d  on f a c t u a l  d a t a  
r a t h e r  t h a n  p r e f e r e n c e . "  A l though  t h e  a u t h o r s  a r e  n o t  spe -  
c i f i c  a b o u t  how t h i s  s h o u l d  b e  done ,  t h e y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  s u c h  
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a quantification "discourages purely subjective opinion." 
This does not seem immediately true; more likely, such quanti- 
fication requires the analyst to be more honest in his sub- 
jective evaluation of impacts, which will be uncompromisingly 
stated in his report and open for direct questioning--as with 
any quantification. The environmental impact matrix provides 
no mechanism for treating uncertainty, and the authors make 
it very clear that one should not try to compare impacts from 
square to square on the same matrix. 
As a summary chart this method is not without merit, 
except that quantification as presented here can easily be 
misinterpreted. Some workers (e-g., Beer, 1974) have attempt- 
ed to coalesce these impact measures by forming the weighted 
sum of matrix entries (the very thing cautioned against in 
Leopold et al., 1971), which not only presumes the assumptions 
of additive desirability but takes impact indices to be inter- 
vally rather than ordinally scaled. 
4. Bishop's Factor Profile 
Bishop's "factor profile" (1972) is in essence a graphical 
technique for displaying project impacts. However, it has 
received some mention as a decision-making tool (e.g., Fischer 
and Ahmed, 1974) and so will be briefly reviewed. A typical 
factor profile is shown in Figure 15. In this profile each 
non-financial impact is scaled on an (-100, +loo) interval 
range on the basis of its relative desirability, -100 being 
the least desirable and +lo0 the most desirable of the impacts 
of contending alternatives against that goal. A decision is 
reached via a four-step procedure: 
1) the economic impact of each alternative is deter- 
mined in benefit to cost ratios, 
2) factor profiles are constructed for each alternative, 
3) dominated alternatives on both the factor profile 
and benefit/cost ratio are eliminated, 
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4) pair comparisons are made on the remainder to assess 
relative desirability (judgementally), and an ordinal 
ranking is thus generated. 
Factor profiles are more a graphical display device than 
a decision tool, thus offering little that Lichfield's balance 
sheet does not. Although Bishop does not extend factor pro- 
files to the separation of group impact, this could be accom- 
plished with minor alteration. The assumption of interval 
scaling seems more restrictive than necessary, as ordinal 
scaling is all that is required. 
5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Matrix Methods 
The ad-vantages of the matrix methods reflect the dis- 
advantages of cost-benefit analysis that they were designed 
to overcome. Their primary advantage is that they allow the 
explicit inclusion on non-efficiency objectives in an analysis, 
although they do not indicate how one should trade off achieve- 
ment of economic and non-economic objectives. However, many 
proponents of matrix methods would say that such trade-offs 
are inherently non-quantifiable and thus can be made only in 
a purely judgemental way. This works satisfactorily when the 
number of non-aggregable impacts is small, but not when it 
is large: still then there is a danger of biasing a decision 
toward economic objectives as the spectrum of impacts is so 
large that a fuller integration is conceptually difficult. 
Secondary advantages of matrix methods are that they are 
good vehicles for presenting impacts to decision-makers, and 
that they do not require quantification of certain impacts, 
such as aesthetic ones, that are difficult to scale. 
The central disadvantage of matrix techniques is that 
they do not tell one how a decision should be made, and when 
secondary procedures are used for considering the totality 
of impacts they often lead to misinterpretations. In partic- 
ular, the schemes that have been used to aggregate matrix 
entries usually assume that there is independence among the 
desirabilities of impacts, and that one may perform mathe- 
matical operations with what are often ordinally scaled 
quantities. 
VI. Preference Theories 
The methods discussed so far assign desirability to 
impacts and thus generate objective functions based on eco- 
nomic impact or simple weighting schemes. Although some of 
these methods carefully scale relative desirabilities of 
levels of single impacts, none adeauately accounts for inter- 
action among impacts. That is, they assume that marginal 
changes in the desirability of levels of one impact do not 
depend on levels of associated impacts; these desirabilities 
are independent. 8 
There does exist a set of methodologies, however, in 
which the desirabilities of multi-attribute impacts are 
rigorously handled, including interdepend-encies among impacts. 
These methodologies are based on a set of simple axioms of 
preference, and from this axiomatic foundation mathematical 
properties of multi-attribute objective functions are derived. 
In this way interrelationships are explici-tly stated, in 
contrast to previously discussed methods in which they were 
implicit and therefore often neglected.. 
These methods are explicitly based on the tenet that 
desirability of impacts derives from subjective preferences 
rather than so-called "objective" criteria, citing the 
failure of general welfare theory to provide that objective 
valuation. 
* ~ n  argument could be made that cost-benefit analysis 
circumvents this interaction, because in economic efficiency 
terms the desirabilities of impacts are independent; but this 
is a narrow case and leads to the common objection that we 
should make evaluations on broader grounds. 
We w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  t h r e e  
l e v e l s  o f  a x i o m a t i c a l l y  based  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n s ,  and t h e n  
t u r n  t o  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  s i t i n g  and a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e i r  
a d v a n t a g e s  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  me thodo log ies .  
I f  one  assumes t h a t  a  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  can  b e  a s s i g n e d  
f o r  any p a i r  o f  i m p a c t s  o r  impact  l e v e l s  ( t h a t  i s ,  i f  f o r  any 
p a i r  o f  i m p a c t s  A and B ,  e i t h e r  A i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  B ,  o r  B 
i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  A ,  o r  A and B a r e  e q u a l l y  p r e f e r a b l e ) ,  t h e n  
a  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  o v e r  an  e n t i r e  set  o f  i m p a c t s  can be  
c o n s t r u c t e d .  F u r t h e r ,  i f  t h e  p r e f e r a b i l i t y  o f  p a i r s  o f  impact  
l e v e l s  can  be a s s e s s e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  p a i r s  o f  impact  l e v e l s  
( t h a t  i s ,  i f  g i v e n  t w o  t y p e s  o f  impac t s  X and Y and t w o  l e v e l s  
o f  e a c h  impact  X i ,  X .  and Y i ,  Y t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r e f e r a b i l i t y  
J j ' 
o f  t h e  p a i r s  ( X i , Y i )  , ( X .  , Y  . )  can be  a s s e s s e d ) ,  t h e n  a  f a m i l y  
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o f  " i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e s "  can  be  g e n e r a t e d  ( F i g u r e  1 6 )  w i t h  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  t h a t  any two p a i r s  o f  impact  l e v e l s  on t h e  same 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e  s h o u l d  b e  e q u a l l y  p r e f e r a b l e  ( e . g . ,  ( X i , Y i ) ,  
X Y  Applying s i m i l a r  a rguments ,  one  can  g e n e r a t e  i n d i f -  
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f e r e n c e  s u r f a c e s  i n  h i g h e r - o r d e r  s p a c e s  ( F i s h b u r n ,  1970) and 
t h u s  an o r d i n a l l y  s c a l e d  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  s p e c i f i e d  s e t s  o f  impact  l e v e l s .  
The i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g  t o  n o t e  h e r e  i s  t h a t  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
s u r f a c e s  a r e  o r d i n a l l y  s c a l e d ;  t h e  normal o p e r a t i o n s  o f  
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  and a d d i t i o n  a r e  n o t  d e f i n e d  o v e r  them, and 
common p r o c e d u r e s  o f  r e d u c i n g  t h e  work o f  a s s e s s m e n t  and 
e v a l u a t i o n  a r e  n o t  a l lowed .  To a s s e s s  a  s e t  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
c u r v e s  r e q u i r e s  i n d i v i d u a l  a s sessment  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r e f e r a -  
b i l i t y  o f  e a c h  p o i n t  i n  t h e  mul t i -d imens iona l  space  and e n t a i l s  
s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f o r t - - t o o  much, i n  f a c t ,  t o  b e  r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  
more t h a n ,  s a y ,  t h r e e  o r  s o  impact  a t t r i b u t e s .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  
i s  no r i g o r o u s  way t o  i n c l u d e  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  
a g a i n  because  t h e  o r d i n a l  s c a l i n g  d o e s  n o t  a l l o w  a r i t h m e t i c a l  
o p e r a t i o n s .  
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Despite these drawbacks in implementation, indifference 
surfaces have been used in siting and project evaluation, most 
notably in the work of Major (1974) and I~lacCrimmon (1968) . 
MacCrimmon and Toda (1969) have also described a procedure 
for obtaining indifference surfaces. An advantage of indif- 
ference surfaces is that the additional assumptions necessary 
to develop integrally scaled functions need not be introduced, 
yet varying marginal rates of preferential substitution among 
impacts can be represented. 
1. Value and Utility Functions 
If an expanded set of axioms on preferability between 
impacts is introduced, integrally scaled preference functions 
can be derived. This results in a function similar to indif- 
ference surfaces but for which each surface represents a 
contour of preference which can be assigned a numerical value, 
and for which the differences between these numerical measures 
carry meaning. This allows the mathematical operations defined 
on integral scales to be performed on the preference function; 
such functions are generally called "value functions." 
By increasing the set of axioms (Appendix V1.B) and by 
modifying the procedures of assessment, value functions can be 
expanded to apply to cases in which impact levels are uncertain 
but can be described by probability distributions. The latter 
function has become widely known as u t i l i t y ,  or sometimes 
m e a s u r a b l e  u t i l i t y ,  in differentiation to the classical con- 
cept of utility in economics. 
Smith (1956) has presented a historical summary of utility 
theory. Although beginnings of the theory can be traced as far 
back as Daniel Bernoulli, it has seen the bulk of its develop- 
ment in the past 25 years. A rigorous treatment of the foun- 
dations can be found in Fishburn's writings (e.g., 1964, 1970). 
2 .  The U t i l i t y - B a s e d  D e c i s i o n  Model 
Given t h e  axioms o f  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y ,  an optimum d e c i s i o n  
i s  t h a t  which  l e a d s  t o  a  max imiza t ion  o f  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  
( P r a t t ,  R a i f f a  and S c h a i f e r ,  1 9 6 5 ) .  I n  t h e  n o t a t i o n  i n t r o -  
duced i n  S e c t i o n  111, t h e  set of  d e c i s i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  l e a d i n g  
t o  t h e  most p r e f e r r e d  set o f  impact  l e v e l s  i s  t h a t  which 
maximizes  
where u ( x , g l s , q )  - i s  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  Al though t h i s  i s  
c o n c e p t u a l l y  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  p r o c e s s  i s  made 
d i f f i c u l t  b e c a u s e  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i t s e l f  c a n  become com- 
p l i c a t e d  u n l e s s  c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t i e s  of  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  p r e f -  
e r e n c e  a r e  shown t o  a p p l y ,  and b e c a u s e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  i s  an  i n v o l v e d  t a s k .  Given a l s o  t h a t  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  
i s  based  on s u b j e c t i v e  p r e f e r e n c e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  whose 
p r e f e r e n c e  s t r u c t u r e  t o  u s e  i s  more e x p l i c i t  h e r e  t h a n  i n  
o t h e r  methods ,  even  though  one  can  f o r c e f u l l y  a r g u e  t h a t  none 
o f  t h e  methods a r e  t r u l y  " o b j e c t i v e " ;  t h u s  "whose o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n  t o  u s e "  i s  a lways  a  problem. 
3. Form o f  t h e  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n  
U n l e s s  c e r t a i n  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  i n t e r d e p e n -  
dence  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  o v e r  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  i m p a c t s  can  b e  
assumed t o  a p p l y  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e ,  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  form 
o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  can  b e  q u i t e  c o m p l i c a t e d  and  even  
approach  i n t r a c t a b i l i t y .  Keeney (1972)  h a s  r ev iewed  forms 
o f  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  and h a s  shown t h a t  two 
" independence  p r o p e r t i e s "  a r e  o f  c r i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  form. These  a r e  c a l l e d  v a l u e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  and u t i l i t y  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  Value  independence  
i s  t h e  more r e s t r i c t i v e  o f  t h e  two and i s  a  s u f f i c i e n t  cond i -  
t i o n  f o r  u t i l i t y  i ndependence ;  u t i l i t y  i ndependence  i s  o n l y  a  
n e c e s s a r y  c o n d - i t i o n  f o r  v a l u e  independence .  
Va lue  independence  i s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  
gambles  depend  o n l y  on t h e  m a r g i n a l  ( i . e . ,  s i n g l e  v a r i a b l e )  
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  i m p a c t s  and n o t  on t h e i r  j o i n t  
( i . e . ,  m u l t i v a r i a t e )  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s .  
U t i l i t y  i ndependence  i s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  p r e f e r e n c e s  
f o r  gambles  i n v o l v i n g  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  one  i m p a c t ,  c o n d i t i o n e d  
on known v a l u e s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  i m p a c t s ,  d o  n o t  depend  on what  
t h o s e  o t h e r  v a l u e s  a r e .  
W e  w i l l  n o t  d w e l l  on d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
f o r  t h e y  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  e l s e w h e r e  ( e . g . ,  Keeney, 1 9 7 3 ) .  The 
i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g  t o  n o t e  i s  t h a t  o n l y  i f  v a l u e  independence  
h o l d s  i s  t h e  s i m p l e  a d d i t i v e  form o f  t h e  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  a p p r o p r i a t e :  
I f  u t i l i t y  i ndependence  h o l d s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  o f t e n ,  t h e n  e i t h e r  
t h e  a d d i t i v e  form o r  t h e  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  form,  
may b e  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  d e p e n d i n g  on w h e t h e r  v a l u e  independence  
a l s o  h o l d s .  Aga in ,  unless one of these properties holds, the 
additive or multiplicative forms of the multi-attributed 
utility function are not applicable. 
T h i s  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  a s s e s s m e n t  and ,  
i f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  s t r u c t u r e  c o n t a i n s  c o n t i n u o u s  v a r i a b l e s ,  a l s o  
r e d u c e s  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  t r a c t a b i l i t y  o f  o p t i m i z a t i o n .  
' ~ 0 t h  k  and  ki  a r e  c o n s t a n t s  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
n  n  
1 ki = 1 i n  t h e  a d d i t i v e  form,  and  1 ki f 1 i n  t h e  
i=l i=l 
m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  form.  
In the siting and environmental impact literature, 
additive forms of the utility function are widely used and 
only infrequently justified by attempts to demonstrate value 
independence--or at times even to mention it. The whole set 
of decision methodologies which use rating scales for indi- 
vidual impacts and a weighted sum for aggregation are forms 
of additive utility and incorrect in preferential terns unT.ess 
the restrictive condition of value independence holds. 
A problem with applying utility theory to siting decisions 
is assessing utility functions. This can be a long process 
and requires some degree of familiarity with the technique by 
individuals whose preferences are being assessed. Further, a 
satisfactory procedure for measuring group utility functions, 
when they are to be used, has yet to be developed. These 
drawbacks were discussed in Section 111. 
While cost benefit and matrix methods have been used 
extensively in plan evaluation and siting, utility models have 
been used only infrequently. An initial application of utility 
to siting public facilities was made by de Neufville and 
Keeney (1974) on the problem of siting the new Mexico City 
Airport. In that work the authors used an impact set consist- 
ing of six objectives and attributes, of which three dealt 
with cost and service and three with social/environmental 
effects: safety, social disruption (as measured by the number 
of people displaced by construction), and noise pollution. In 
the final analysis, however, the problem was seen to be an 
innately political one dealing with phasing levels of commit- 
ment to opposinq sites. 
An attempt to apply utility models with a limited set of 
objectives to power plant siting in New England was made by 
Gros (1974), who also addressed the problem of differing 
interest groups having different utility functions. However, 
in neither the de Neufville-Keeney nor the Gros study were 
utility functions directly assessed for groups affected. by 
siting decisions; they were assessed either for government 
decision-makers, or for representatives of interest groups. 
Keeney and Nair (1974) and Fisher and Ahmed (1974) have 
discussed the use of utility theory for siting power plants, 
though without actually reporting application of the method. 
Dee et al. (1973) have developed an "environmental evaluation 
system" for water resource projects, which is a set of non- 
linear single-attribute utility functions over 78 attributes 
of environmental impact which are aggregated by a weighted 
sum, of the form of Equation 6, and thus in essence is a multi- 
attribute utility function for environmental impacts of the 
additive form. 
5. Advantaaes and Disadvantaaes of Preference Methods 
The advantages of utility analysis over the methods 
previously discussed spring from its rigorous handling of 
preference for impacts and uncertainty. It is the only one 
of the evaluation methods that adequately accounts for depen- 
dence among the desirabilities of different impacts and for 
uncertainty in impact predictions. The method allows dif- 
ferences in desirability as perceived by different groups to 
be introduced, and theory is currently being developed to 
incorporate varying group utility functions analytically in 
decision-making (Kirkwood, 1974). 
The disadvantages derive mainly from problems of applica- 
tion: assessing utility, dealing with sometimes messy mathe- 
matics, and lack of conceptual simplicity. The problem of 
coalescing the utility functions of different groups into 
one function is more explicit with utility models, but is a 
problem inherent in siting and not in a particular method. 
Other methods either ignore this question or treat it judge- 
mentally. Perhaps the major problem is measurement: what 
are we measuring when we assess over large groups, and does 
whatever we measure accurately reflect individuals' "true" 
preferences or merely their momentary whims? The procedures 
of utility assessment seem better on this point than opinion 
surveys generally, as they confront a subje,ct with decisions 
involving trade-offs among impacts rather than simply asking 
opinion-type questions; however, the objection of economists 
that surveys and market behavior represent qualitatively 
different things and that the latter may be more valid and 
reliable still plagues the effort. The answer to this prob- 
lem is not immediately apparent, and certainly a closer look 
at the measurement problem might prove more helpful than much 
of the current effort to expand the mathematical base of 
utility theory. 
APPENDIX A 
Utilitv Assessment 10 
The assessment of utility functions involves having the 
subject whose preferences are to be assessed choose among 
various alternatives with uncertain and certain outcomes; then 
an interval scaling of his preferences is back-figured from 
his answers. As an example, consider the choice between a 
certainty of receiving $5,000, and the wager with equal chances 
of winning $10,000 and $0. For convenience, we scale the 
utility function so that ~($10,000) = 1 and ~ ( $ 0 )  = 0. The 
expected utility value of the wager is 
If the subject chooses the sure $5,000 over the wager, then 
we can infer that the utility of $5,000 must be greater than 
the expected utility of the wager, which is 0.5. Similarly, 
if the subject, faced with the choice between $3,000 and the 
wager, chooses the wager, then the utility of $3,000 must be 
below 0.5. Questioning would continue until a value is 
established for which the subject is indifferent. 
A similar procedure would be used in multi-attribute 
problems. A series of choices is presented to establish 
whether preference independence properties hold, and whether 
a sum or product form is appropriate. If either is appropri- 
ate, the problem reduces to assessing single-attribute scalings, 
followed by simple multi-attribute questions to obtain scaling 
constants among impacts. If the simple forms are not appro- 
priate, more complicated series of questions must be used. 
'o~ull descriptions of utility assessment can be found in 
Schlaifer (1959). Practical assessments are discussed in 
Gros (1974) and Keeney (1972). Also, interactive computer 
programs are available (Schlaifer, 1971; Keeney & Sicherman, 1975). 
APPENDIX B 
Axioms o f  U t i l i t y  Theory 
U t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  a n a l y s i s  depends  on s e v e n  axioms.  
Be fo re  s t a t i n g  them, it i s  h e l p f u l  t o  d e f i n e  some n o t a t i o n .  
A s i m p l e  l o t t e r y ,  w r i t t e n  L ( x l , p , x 2 ) ,  i s  t h e  e v e n t  where t h e r e  
i s  a  chance  p t h a t  xl w i l l  o c c u r  and  a  chance  1 - p t h a t  x2  
w i l l  o c c u r .  The symbol > means t h a t ,  when f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  c h o i c e  
between t h e  e v e n t  t o  t h e  r i g h t  and t h a t  t o  t h e  l e f t  o f  t h e  syrrl- 
b o l t  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  p r e f e r r e d .  The symbol - means t h a t  t h e  
dec i s ion -maker  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  c h o i c e  between t h e  two 
e v e n t s ,  and < means t h a t  t h e  e v e n t  t o  t h e  l e f t  i s  n o t  p r e f e r r e d  
t o  t h a t  on t h e  r i g h t .  Thus ,  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  xl - L ( x 2 , p , x 3 )  
s a y s  t h a t  t h e  dec i s ion -maker  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  c h o i c e  
between t h e  xl  f o r  c e r t a i n ,  and t h e  l o t t e r y  y i e l d i n g  e i t h e r  
x2 w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  p  o r  x3  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 - p .  W e  can  
now f o r m a l l y  s t a t e  t h e  ax ioms,  based  on t h o s e  used  i n  P r a t t ,  
R a i f f a  and S c h l a i f e r  ( 1 9 6 5 ) .  
Axiom 1: Existence of Relative Preferences. F o r  e v e r y  
p a i r  o f  v a l u e s  xl and x 2 ,  t h e  d-ecis ion-maker  w i l l  
have p r e f e r e n c e s  such  t h a t  e i t h e r  xl - x 2 ,  xl > x 2 ,  
o r  x 2  > x l .  
Axiom 2: Transitivity. For  any l o t t e r i e s  L1, L2 ,  and  L3, 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h o l d s :  
i )  i f  L1 > L2 and  L2 > L3 t h e n  L1 > L3 
ii) i f  L1 - L2 and L2 - L3 t h e n  L1 - L3 
and s o  on. 
Note t h a t  any d e t e r m i n i s t i c  v a l u e  xi can  b e  e x p r e s s e d  a s  a  
d e g e n e r a t e  l o t t e r y ,  s o  Axiom 2 r e q u i r e s  t r a n s i t i v i t y  between 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  e v e n t s  a l s o .  
Axiom 3 :  Comparison o f  S i m p l e  L o t t e r i e s .  I f  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n -  
maker x 1 > x 2 ,  t h e n  
i) L1 ( x 1 1 ~ 1 1 x 2 )  " L2 ( x l I p 2 , x 2 )  i f  p1 = p2 , 
ii) L l ( ~ 1 , p 1 1 ~ 2 )  > L2 ( X ~ , ~ ~ , X ~ I  i f  pl > p2 . 
Axiom 4 :  Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  P r e f e r e n c e s .  For each  p o s s i b l e  
consequence x ,  t h e  decis ion-maker  can s p e c i f y  a  
number I T ( X ) ,  0 < I T ( X )  < 1 ,  such t h a t  
x - L ( X * , I T  ( x )  ,x,)  , where x* i s  t h e  most p r e f e r r e d  
and x, t h e  l e a s t  p r e f e r r e d  outcome. The v a l u e  
I T ( X ) ,  t h e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  l o t t e r y ,  
i s  a measure o f  u t i l i t y .  
Axiom 5: Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  Judgementa l  U n c e r t a i n t i e s .  
For  each  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t  E which may a f f e c t  t h e  
consequence o f  a  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  d-ecision-maker can 
s p e c i f y  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  P ( E ) ,  0 ( P ( E )  < 1, such t h a t  
he i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  between L ( x * , P ( E )  , x * )  and t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  where he  r e c e i v e s  x* i f  e v e n t  E o c c u r s  
and x* i f  it does  n o t .  
Axiom 6 :  S u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y .  I f  a  d e c i s i o n  problem i s  modif ied  
by r e p l a c i n g  one l o t t e r y  o r  e v e n t  by a n o t h e r  which 
i s  e q u a l l y  p r e f e r r e d ,  t h e n  he shou ld  be  i n d i f f e r e n t  
between t h e  o l d  and t h e  modi f i ed  d e c i s i o n  problems.  
Axiom 7 :  E q u i v a l e n c e  o f  C o n d i t i o n a l  and U n c o n d i t i o n a l  
P r e f e r e n c e s .  L e t  L1 and L2 d e s i g n a t e  l o t t e r i e s  
t h a t  a r e  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  i f  e v e n t  E o c c u r s .  A f t e r  
it i s  known whether  o r  n o t  E o c c u r r e d ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n -  
maker must have t h e  same p r e f e r e n c e  between L1 and 
L2 a s  he  had b e f o r e  it was known whether  E o c c u r r e d .  
V I I .  C o n c l u s i o n s  
W e  have  r ev iewed  t h r e e  m e t h o d o l o g i e s  which a p p l y  m u l t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  t o  s i t e  s e l e c t i o n  problems f o r  
l a r g e  c o n s t r u c t e d  f a c i l i t i e s .  Our ma jo r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  a r e  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g .  
1. The m e t h o d o l o g i e s  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by h a v i n g  d i f f e r -  
e n t  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s .  One must  b e  aware  o f  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n s  u n d e r l y i n g  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s ,  and 
s e l e c t  t h a t  which b e s t  f i t s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  problem 
c o n s i d e r e d .  
2 .  Only c e r t a i n  m a t h e m a t i c a l  o p e r a t i o n s  on p r e f e r e n c e  
measu res  a r e  p e r m i s s i b l e .  One s h o u l d  k e e p  i n  mind. 
t h e  s c a l e  on which p r e f e r e n c e  measu res  have  been  made, 
and t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
F a i l u r e  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  c a n  r e s u l t  i n  numbers t h a t  
have  no i n t e r r e l a t i o n a l  meaning.  
3 .  S e n s i t i v i t y  a n a l y s e s  s h o u l d  a lways  b e  pe r fo rmed .  
U n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n ,  a l o n g  w i t h  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  impac t  p r e -  
d - i c t i o n ,  l e a d  t o  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  
v a l u e s .  One s h o u l d  check how s e n s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  a r e  
t o  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s .  
4 .  S i t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  i n h e r e n t l y  p o l i t i c a l .  The 
a n a l y s t ' s  r o l e  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  
a l l  b u t  t h e  two o r  t h r e e  " b e s t "  s i tes ,  and t h e n  t o  
d e t a i l  i m p a c t s  f o r  t h e s e ,  a g g r e g a t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  ma jo r  
o b j e c t i v e s  o f  c o s t ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e g r a d a t i o n  and 
s o c i a l  d i s r u p t i o n .  
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